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Abstract— Short-range audio channels have appealing dis-
tinguishing characteristics: ease of use, low deployment costs,
and easy to tune frequencies, to cite a few. Moreover, thanks
to their seamless adaptability to the security context, many
techniques and tools based on audio signals have been recently
proposed. However, while the most promising solutions are
turning into valuable commercial products, acoustic channels
are also increasingly used to launch attacks against systems
and devices, leading to security concerns that could thwart
their adoption. To provide a rigorous, scientific, security-oriented
review of the field, in this paper we survey and classify methods,
applications, and use-cases rooted on short-range audio channels
for the provisioning of security services—including Two-Factor
Authentication techniques, pairing solutions, device authorization
strategies, defense methodologies, and attack schemes. Moreover,
we also point out the strengths and weaknesses deriving from
the use of short-range audio channels. Finally, we provide open
research issues in the context of short-range audio channels
security, calling for contributions from both academia and
industry.
Index Terms—Audio Channel Security, Audio-based Authen-
tication, Pairing via Audio, Audio Attacks, Audio for Cyber-
Physical Systems Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
SOund, including human speech, is commonly consideredas a natural and intuitive means to quickly interact with
automatic devices [1]. Indeed, ambient sounds, as well as
voice commands issued towards audio-enabled devices, are
often conceived as a natural, intuitive, and minimal effort ap-
proach for humans to communicate with machines, especially
if compared to human-imperceptible Radio Frequency (RF)
transmissions and distracting visual-tactile interfaces [2].
Recently, communications using short-range audio channels
have attracted increasing interest, in academia as well as
industry, as demonstrated by the expected 31.80 USD billions
for this specific market expected by the year 2023 [3]. In
this context, security-oriented applications of the short-range
audio stem in a prominent position. Besides aspects related
to the enhanced usability, there are mainly two dominating
research directions. For the defense of systems and devices, the
general opinion in the research area is that acoustic channels
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are a more secure communication channel when compared
to legacy RF communications. For instance, given that audio
channels can be perceived by participating entities, they are
usually assumed to be robust against active attacks, since
any malicious signal could be heard by the participants as
well—and hence the attack could be detected [4]. At the same
time, the increasing diffusion and affordability of Machine
Learning (ML) techniques have boosted the efficiency of audio
signals classification and identification, leading to low-cost and
disrupting attacks. Indeed, recent efforts demonstrated that the
sound emitted from specific devices, such as keyboards and 3D
printers, leaks unique information about the specific performed
task, e.g., the pressed button and the printed object features,
respectively [5], [6]. Considering that these devices do not
provide any inherent defense strategy to protect information
leaked on the acoustic channel, such attacks are stealthy and
potentially disrupting [7].
Inspired by these research challenges and by the relevant
contributions in the area over the last years, in this paper we
survey the mechanisms, applications, use-cases and research
challenges involving the use of short-range audio channels
for the provision of security services. We show how the
peculiar features of the short-range acoustic signals, including
physical proximity between communicating entities and audi-
bility of the communications, are used to provide additional
authentication schemes, pairing, context-based authorization,
and defense tools, as well as to launch attacks against systems
and devices. As a novel contribution, we divide and classify the
scientific literature according to the provided security feature.
In addition, for each of the categories identified in our survey,
we explain and compare the most important contributions
in the actual literature. Furthermore, we also identify some
crucial research challenges, whose further investigation could
unleash the full potential of audio-based security solutions,
and pave the way to their large-scale adoption.
Overall, the following key contributions are provided in this
manuscript (see Fig. 1 for a graphical overview).
• We survey the mechanisms, applications, use-cases and
research challenges involving the use of short-range audio
channels for the provision of security services to systems
and users.
• We classify the security services provided via short-range
audio channels into five (5) different categories, including
authentication schemes (Section III), pairing (Section IV),
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2Fig. 1. Overview of the taxonomy and the organization of our paper. We classify security schemes leveraging the audio channel based on the specific security
services they intend to provide, identifying two-factor authentication approaches (Section III), secure device pairing strategies (Section IV), authorization
techniques (Section IV-B), attack vectors (Section VI), and systems defense schemes (Section VII).
context-based authorization (Section IV-B), attacks (Sec-
tion VI), and defense schemes (Section VII), detailing and
cross-comparing them along the most important features.
• We identify several important research challenges in each
of the aforementioned domains, where further scientific
contributions are still required to fill the actual gaps
(Section VIII).
• We identify a few promising future research directions
involving the usage of short-range audio channels, whose
thorough investigation could further unleash the potential
of these communication technologies (Section VIII).
Paper Main Topic Addressed
[8] Survey of the approaches supporting the pairing between
devices leveraging the physical context shared by
participating entities.
[9] Survey of strategies used to establish the co-presence
between communicating devices.
[10] Survey of multi-factor authentication techniques.
[11] Survey of attacks exploiting side-channels and unintentional
information leakage.
[12] Survey of audio and visual CAPTCHAs used to distinguish
humans from bots.
[13] Survey of steganography and other information hiding
techniques.
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF RELATED SURVEYS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TOPICS
As highlighted in Tab. I, some security solutions based
on audio channels have been quickly touched in the recent
literature by few surveys, focusing either on context-based
security [8], [9], authentication solutions [10], side-channel
attacks [11], CAPTCHAs [12] or forensic applications [13].
However, to the best of our knowledge, our contribution is the
first to specifically survey, classify, and systematize security
methods, applications, and use-cases using only short-range
audio channels, as well as to evaluate such strategies across
different use-cases and objectives, and to propose further
research challenges—specific to this domain.
Being focused on short-range audio channels, our survey
does not include underwater communication schemes, audio
watermarking, and audio forensic techniques, as they involve
either long distances or considerations related to the audio
signal processing, not specifically meant for secure communi-
cation and applications.
We believe that this work could attract researchers coming
from heterogeneous backgrounds, either interested in finding
and applying unconventional security solutions to classical
security issues, or researchers particularly skilled in the spe-
cific audio domain, finding in security applications the perfect
area where they could provide different perspectives and in-
novative solutions. Indeed, through the lenses of scientifically
rigorous work, the interested readers will find meaningful
mechanisms and solutions related to the physical properties of
audio channels used for security applications, and how they
are integrated into modern computer systems and devices to
enhance their security level. Further, open research challenges
are also highlighted, to inspire further research in this exciting
domain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides the necessary preliminary details about the audio
processing, as well as the most important techniques used
in the literature for security services via audio. Section III
focuses on applications of audio to Two-Factor Authentication
protocols, Section IV provides a comprehensive overview
3of the techniques based on audio used for the pairing of
previously unknown devices, while Section IV-B details how
audio can be used to authorize the usage of systems and
devices. The most important attacks exploiting audio channels
and their components are discussed in Section VI, while the
use of audio as a defense tool is discussed in Section VII.
The most important research challenges arising from the above
discussions are summarized and explained in Section VIII,
while Section IX closes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce some technical concepts
related to the analysis and usage of short-range audio signals.
While a thorough analysis of these concepts is out of the scope
of this contribution, their high-level description will be useful
to fully catch differences and similarities between scientific
contributions applying audio signals for different security-
oriented tasks. Section II-A illustrates the basic features of
audio signals and their processing on modern computers, while
the fundamental phenomena behind human speech generation
and electronic speech reproduction are presented in Section
II-B and Section II-C, respectively. Section II-D provides an
overview of the most used techniques to compare audio signals
is provided, while the logic of the masking sound technique
and the cocktail party problem are provided in Section II-E
and Section II-F. Finally, Section II-G highlights how short-
range audio links can be used to estimate the distance between
communicating entities.
A. Analyzing Audio Signals
The audible frequencies range, i.e., the range of audio sig-
nals that could be heard by human ears, spans the bandwidth
[20 - 20,000] Hz. In practice, these limits fluctuate a few Hz
above or below according to the particular individual, as spe-
cific features of the human ear can slightly increase or decrease
sounds perception. The sounds below the minimum audible
frequency are defined infra-sounds, while sounds above the
20,000 Hz threshold are ultrasounds.
A common representation for the spectral power density
in such a wide bandwidth is based on the use of octave
bands, splitting the above range into 11 non-overlapping sub-
bands. Analyzing audio signals in octave bands (or in their
sub-components) allows for a more precise investigation of
the features of the complex signal, as well as an in-depth
analysis of the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) across the audible
range [14].
Specifically, octave bands are selected such that the center
frequency of a given band is twice the center frequency of
the immediately lower band. Fig. 2 shows the details of the
octave bands, reported according to their calculated center
frequencies.
Note that the lower and upper limits of the audible range are
essentially defined by the octave bands containing the lower
and the higher frequencies that the human ear can receive.
Octave bands are mainly used when first analyzing a sound,
to identify the portion of the audio spectrum where the audio
signal is mainly concentrated.
Fig. 2. Octave bands used for audio signal representation and analysis in
digital systems. There are 11 octave bands, and the center of any octave band
is chosen such that it has a frequency that is exactly the double of the center
frequency of the previous octave band.
In addition, octave bands are usually further divided into
three ranges, namely one-third-octaves bands. The use of
one-third-octave bands has been standardized as a reference
baseline for use in commodity scientific instruments and mea-
surements. They are mainly used in environmental and noise
control applications, to provide a further in-depth outlook on
noise levels across the frequencies.
B. Human Speech sounds
The human speech is the result of complex interactions
between different elements of the human phonetic apparatus,
including the vocal cords, teeth, lips, and mouth structure, to
name a few, as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Physical elements of the human phonetic apparatus involved in speech
generation. The vocal cords generate the sound, characterized by a minimum
frequency, i.e., the fundamental frequency, and multiple harmonics at higher
frequencies. The sound is shaped by the tongue, the lips, the teeth, and the
nasal cavity, that filter out some harmonics and produce the final sound emitted
by the lips.
Without loss of generality, a simplistic model is frequently
used, where the speech sound is modeled as the combination of
two different effects. A voiced source, physically coincident
with the vibration of the vocal cords, generates the signal,
characterized by a minor frequency, namely the Fundamental
Frequency, and harmonic frequencies at multiples of the
fundamental one. This signal is further shaped by a filter, mod-
eling the combined effect of the tongue, lips, teeth and nasal
cavity. Overall, these components remove higher-frequencies
harmonics and produce the final signal coming out from the
lips. Typically, women and men have fundamental frequencies
in the range [165-255] Hz and [85-180] Hz, respectively [15].
This is caused by the structure of the vocal cords, that men
have typically larger than women. However, given that no new
frequencies are introduced by the elements in the mouth, the
voice of an individual is typically uniquely associated with
its fundamental frequency, i.e., the lowest frequency in the
voice signal, also known as the pitch of the speaker’s voice.
It is worth noting that the final sound produced by a human
4is given by the interaction between the action of the lips and
the nose, further shaping the tone of the voice.
A technique that is frequently used for speech recognition
is the Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC), described
in [16]. This technique best describes how the human phonetic
system perceives sounds. The MFCC technique divides the
whole sampled window in very short windows, where the
audio signal can be safely assumed as stationary. Then, the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of each window is computed and
it is shifted to an alternative frequency axis, namely the non-
linear Mel scale, further divided into a set of bands, known
as the Mel bands. This step is useful given that the speech
spectrum is very wide and it does not follow a linear scale.
Thus, to represent the speech signal, an alternative logarithmic
scale is used, summarizing the spectrum in an increasingly
wide bandwidth.
For each Mel band, the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
is applied to the logarithm of the power spectral density of the
input signal, to provide the final MFCC representation. There
are studies, such as [17], that demonstrated the suitability of
the MFCC representation for speech recognition, as it models
particularly well the variability of the human speech across dif-
ferent users. In addition, the MFCC technique enables further
applications, such as the speaker emotion recognition [18].
C. Electronic Speakers Sounds
The simplified internal structure of a modern sound-
generation speaker is depicted in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Internal components of a modern speaker. The control logic provides
current to the voice coil, generating a magnetic field. The magnetic field
induces the movements of the diaphragm, which modulates air pressure and
produces the sound waves.
Modern speakers reproduce sounds through the controlled
oscillation of the diaphragm, steered by a control circuit
and a voice coil. The control circuit receives an electronic
signal from the device where the speaker is connected. The
control circuit provides current to the voice coil, which further
generates a magnetic field. The voice coil is located in-between
two magnets, and the interaction among them causes a force
that induces the diaphragm to move. The speaker also contains
a spider, physically connecting the diaphragm to the case. Its
role is mainly structural, as it should ensure the persistent
connection between the diaphragm and the case while also
allowing a free oscillation of the diaphragm and the voice coil
to return in its original position. Finally, it is worth noting that
the material the case consists of is crucial to not deteriorate
the produced sound too much. Indeed, any material has its
resonance frequency, causing resonating effects in the sub-bass
region, in the frequency band [20-80] Hz.
The physical features of the speakers directly impact the
performance of the device. Typically, this is expressed via
the Frequency Response Curve, indicating the quality of the
sounds reproduced by the speaker at a given frequency. Usu-
ally, to guarantee optimal performances, speakers are designed
to work well with either low frequencies or higher frequencies,
due to physical trade-offs (size of the materials). Indeed, to
induce higher frequency sounds, the diaphragm should move
more air, and hence, the voice coil would need to induce a
stronger magnetic field by maintaining the same form factor
of the speaker. Thus, it could be possible only if the voice
coil is larger, i.e., by changing the physical components in the
speaker. This is the reason at the basis of the choice operated
by modern sound systems, that are equipped with distinct
speakers, each optimized for the bandwidth of the sound to
be reproduced [19].
D. Comparing Audio Recordings
Comparing audio recordings to establish their similarity is
a classical problem in audio processing, very frequently faced
by the approaches available in the literature. Hence, various
techniques have been proposed.
A common metric to assess the similarity between the
two sound registrations is established via a similarity score.
It is computed as the average of the maximum normalized
cross-correlation over the pair of signal components acquired
by the two devices. This metric is particularly useful when
the two audio recordings are quasi-synchronized, and an
indication of their similarity can be extracted from their time-
domain representation. Defining the two signals x and y as
n-points discrete time series, namely x(n) and y(n), the cross-
correlation cx,y(l) is obtained with reference to a time lag
l ∈ {0, 1}, as depicted in the following Eq. 1.
cx,y(l) =
n−1∑
i=0
x(i) · y(i− l), (1)
with y(i) = 0 when i < 0 or i > n − 1. Usually, two
audio recordings are characterized by different amplitudes, as
the receiving microphones are located at different distances
from the emitting sources. To eliminate dependency from the
amplitudes, a normalized measure is taken as in the following
Eq. 2, to map the correlation values in the interval [-1,1].
c′x,y =
cx,y(l)√
cx,x(0) · cy,y(0)
. (2)
Indeed, a value c′x,y = 1 indicates that the two recordings
have equal evolution in the time domain, independently from
their amplitudes. A value c′x,y = −1 indicates that they have
equal evolution in the time domain but opposite signs, while
the value c′x,y = 0 indicates that they are not correlated each
other.
5For an n-octave band’s audio signal, the similarity score is
finally defined as in Eq. 3.
Sx,y =
1
n
n∑
i=1
c′xi,yi(l). (3)
When the frequency domain features are important as well
as time-domain ones, standard classification techniques can be
applied.
In the following, we briefly discuss Machine Learning
Techniques used for classification, Statistical Classification
Methods, and finally, the Robust Sound Hash (RSH) technique.
1) Machine Learning Techniques:
We briefly describe the most important machine learning
techniques used in the scientific contributions included in this
survey, i.e., Support Vector Machines (SVM), Random Forest,
and k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), as well as the widespread
k-Fold Cross-Validation technique. For interested readers, we
recall that a comprehensive study of the most useful machine
learning techniques for audio analysis is available in [20].
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [21] represent a
supervised learning model for classifying data, i.e., assessing
which pre-defined class is more similar compared to a new
set of data. As a supervised learning technique, starting from
a set of training data labeled on purpose as belonging to one
or more categories, a SVM can classify new data as being
part of a class or another. In addition, a set of unlabelled data,
namely testing data, are provided for classification. Assuming
s categories, the SVM internally builds a s − 1-dimensional
hyperplane in an s-dimensional space leveraging the labeled
data, and maps the unlabelled one in this space. The output
classification is provided as the category whose training
points are the nearest to the testing data.
Random Forest [22] is an ensemble supervised machine
learning technique, built as a combination of decision tree
predictors. As an ensemble learning technique, the provided
classification is the result of a decision taken collectively,
from a large number of classifiers. The idea behind ensembles
classification is based upon the premise that a set of classifiers
can provide a more accurate and generalized classification
than a single classifier, thus being less prone to over-fitting.
When using Random Forest classifiers, each classifier is a
tree, and each tree depends on the values of a random vector
independently sampled, assuming the same distribution for
all the trees in the forest.
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [23] is a supervised machine
learning algorithm able to solve both classification and
regression problems. This methodology is based on the
observation that instances with similar properties are
generally found close together within a dataset. The
classification method determines the label of an unclassified
object, by observing the classes of its nearest neighbors.
Thus, the algorithm determines the single most frequent class
label in the set of labels of the k instances nearest to the
unclassified object.
K-Fold Cross-Validation [24] is an accuracy estimation
method that allows evaluating how the results of a model can
be generalized to an independent dataset. The main objective
of cross-validation methods is to estimate the generalization
of a model, i.e., to understand its accuracy in the classification
of data that it had never seen before, minimizing the effect
of overfitting problems. The method consists in partitioning
the dataset into subsets, some of them (the training set) used
to perform the training of the model, and the remaining ones
to be used for validation (the validation set) or testing (the
testing set) purposes. Overall, it is worth noting that the SVM
technique leads to better performances when dealing with
multiple dimensions and continuous features, achieving its
maximum prediction accuracy when the sample size is large.
The Random Forest technique, instead, performs better when
dealing with numerical and categorical features. Random
Forest returns the probability of belonging to a class, while
SVM calculates the distance to the boundary. Without loss of
generality, we notice that no single techniques can outperform
other algorithms over all datasets. Thus, the main issue
when dealing with classification problems is to understand
the conditions where a particular technique can significantly
outperform other algorithms on a given application [25].
2) Other Statistical classification Metrics:
In the context of audio signal classification, the typical
features used for optimal audio classification are the time
and frequency correlation. While the time-domain correlation
features the same logic previously described, the frequency
domain correlation can be expressed via the Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient. Defining X(k) and Y (k) the FFT of the two
audio recordings x(t) and y(t), with k = 1...m, respectively,
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is defined in Eq. 4, as:
sf (X,Y ) =
∑m
k=1
(
X(k)− X¯) (Y (k)− Y¯ )√∑m
k=1
(
X(k)− X¯)2∑mk=1 (Y (k)− Y¯ )2 ,
(4)
where X¯ and Y¯ are the mean of the vectors X(k) and Y (k),
respectively [26].
Another coefficient, widely used to decide whether a predic-
tion is correlated to the data or it is closer to a random guess,
is the Matthews’ Correlation Coefficient (MCC), defined as in
Eq. 5 [27].
|MCC| =
√
χ2
n
, (5)
where χ is the chi-square [28] of the variables representing
the two audio recordings.
Some other metrics can be used in descriptive statistics, such
as the largest and the smallest observation values, defined as
the values of the greatest and least elements of a sample,
respectively.
A few classification systems used time-domain features in
combination with other ones, since alone they are often not
enough descriptive [29]. An example is the classification
system presented by the authors in [30], which uses the
duration of harmonic segments as a feature to identify human
speech on audio samples.
Table II provides a summary of the most used correla-
tion/similarity classification techniques in the scientific con-
tributions included in this survey.
6Classification
Technique Description
Time
Domain
Freq.
Domain
Pearson’s
Correlation
Coefficient
Expresses the frequency
domain correlation. 7 3
MCC Check if prediction iscorrelated to the data. 7 3
Similarity
score
Evaluates the similarity
between two sounds. 3 7
MFCC
Represents the short-term
power spectrum
of a sound.
7 3
Peak Ratios Considers the peak valuesof two variables. 3 3
Specific Band
Energy
Considers the energy value
in a specific octave band. 7 3
TABLE II
MOST POPULAR CORRELATION/SIMILARITY CLASSIFICATION
TECHNIQUES.
3) Robust Sound Hash:
Another technique used to compare audio recordings is the Ro-
bust Sound Hash (RSH), especially when the exact matching
between the audio recordings is desired. Ideally, to compare
two audio recordings, a viable solution would be to compute
the digest of each audio recording samples via a standard
cryptographic hashing function, and to verify the matching
of the two digests. However, as per the basic properties of
cryptographic hashing functions, even small differences in
source files would lead to totally different digests [31]. Thus,
in the context of audio files, where the background random
noise is always present, they are not applicable. A valuable
alternative is the use of comparison mechanisms that change
slightly in response to a minor variance of the input. An
example is the Robust Sound Hash (RSH) technique, designed
in [32]. The RSH divides the input file in different frames,
each containing 1s of recording. Then, it applies a specific
function to this digest, and it outputs a fixed-length string
representing the sampling interval. The digests produced for
each time frame are concatenated to form the final output.
Then, the similarity between the two audio files is computed
as the Hamming Distance between the two digests, i.e., the
number of dissimilar bits. Because of the unique features of
the function used in signal processing, similar audio recordings
will have low dissimilar values. Thus, a threshold can be
established to determine if two hashes are similar enough to
be considered as matching recordings.
E. Masking Sounds
The Sound Masking technique is frequently used in audio-
based defense systems to protect against unauthorized eaves-
dropping. It inherits its core logic from the Friendly Jam-
ming technique, widely used in the wireless security research
domain to hide sensitive information or block any other
communication other than the authorized ones [33], [34]. The
main logic of the sound masking strategy is illustrated in Fig.
5.
The audio leakage from a system, e.g. a keyboard or
a vibration-based communication system, as thoroughly de-
scribed in Section VI, can lead to the identification of privacy-
sensitive information, such as the pressed key or the sound’s
Fig. 5. Logic of sound masking mechanism. White noise produced on purpose
sums up to the signal leaked from a given device, in order to corrupt it and
make it unrecoverable to an adversarial Digital Signal Processing logic.
vibration. To mislead an external attacker, white noise is
produced typically by an additional device coupled with the
main communication channel, and it is emitted on purpose to
taint the information signal. The malicious device, getting the
mixed-signal, has the hard task of separating emitting compo-
nents through Digital Signal Processing (DSP) techniques to
estimate the useful signal.
F. Separating Sounds: The Cocktail Party Problem
The audio masking strategy described in Section II-E is
effective only if an external third-party cannot perform a
separating attack, i.e., it cannot decouple the jamming signal
from the leaked information signal. Indeed, an adversary
could perform such an attack in two different phases. In an
online phase, it could gather the mixture signals via multiple
microphones arranged randomly in the environment. Then, it
could try to estimate the two addends, i.e., the information
signal and the jamming signal. Assuming to have two different
receivers and two different signal components s1 and s2,
the mixtures x1 and x2 recovered by the microphones are
expressed by Eq. 6.
x = H · s+ e→ [x1 x2] = [h1,1 h1,2h2,1 h2,2
]
+
[
e1 e2
]
, (6)
where e1 and e2 represent the noise associated with each
sampling of the audio signal by the receivers.
In the literature, this task is commonly referred to as
the Cocktail Party Problem—in an analogy with the task of
separating the linear mixture of different voices at a cocktail
party, where voices of different tones overlap each other [35].
The class of approaches used to solve this problem is called
Blind Source Separation (BSS) [36]. There are many BSS al-
gorithms available in the literature, each one based on specific
assumptions on the signals involved in the mixtures [37]. One
of the most successful is the Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) technique, whose goal is to express the mixed signal as
a linear combination of non-Gaussian components, in a way
that they are as much statistically independent as possible [38].
Regarding Eq. 6, this is equivalent to find an un-mixing matrix
W , such as the following Eq. 7 is verified.
sˆ =
[
sˆ1 sˆ2
]
= W · x =
[
w1,1 w1,2
w2,1 w2,2
]
· [x1 x2] , (7)
7Note that, if it is successful, ICA can recover the original
mixing sources less than a scaling factor and a different
naming (ordering) of the signals. However, in the context of
audio mixtures, ICA may face applicability issues when the
sources of the signals are very close to each other. In this
case, the algorithm cannot precisely identify the exact number
of the sources, or it confuses part of a signal with the other,
resulting in degraded performance [39].
G. Distance Bounding via Audio
Like any other wireless signal, short-range audio signals can
be used to provide location estimations. Specifically, looking
at the signal emitted by the speakers and recorded back by the
microphone, the emitting device could get a rough estimate of
the device-user distance, further useful for advanced security
tasks. Fig. 6 illustrates a sample scenario.
The simplest way to estimate the distance between a user
Fig. 6. Audio-based distance bounding. At least two receiving microphones
M1 and M2 are used to differentiate the timestamps of the signals received
from a single source speaker S, and to estimate the distance between the
transmitter and the receivers.
and a device is to recur to the timestamps of the emitted
and received signals. Let us assume that a single receiver is
available, namely M1, that t0 is the time in which the sound
is emitted and tr is the reception time on the microphone M1.
The Time of Flight (ToF) can be obtained as ToF = tr − t0.
Defining c the speed of sound, conventionally equal to 340
m/s, the distance between the user and the device can be easily
obtained as in the following Eq. 8.
d = c · ToF
2
. (8)
While being extremely simple to implement, the results ob-
tained through the above formula, unfortunately, are affected
by large errors, especially because of the large inaccuracies in
timestamps gathered on mobile devices, such as smartphones
and wearables, caused by various delays introduced in the
processing chain [40], [41]. Thus, two techniques are mainly
used. Where the timestamps of the signal are the only available
data to be used and the emitting frequency cannot be changed,
the Direction of Arrival (DoA) technique is a viable option.
DoA resorts to the time of arrivals of the signals on at least
two receivers (in the case of audio signals, microphones), to
determine the location where the source is. Assume t1 and
t2 to be the reception timestamps of a given signal emitted
by a source S and received by two receivers, M1 and M2,
respectively. Defining τ = t1− t2, the angle of arrival θ can
be computed as in the following equation Eq. 9.
θ = cos−1
cτ
d
. (9)
Eq. 9 provides a single direction over which the source is
located. The process can be repeated for every couple of con-
sidered receivers, providing an equal number of directions and
thus a precise estimate of the specific point where the source
lies. At the same time, inaccuracies due to environmental noise
or hardware imperfections could be reduced.
An even more effective strategy to achieve source localiza-
tion, namely Frequency-Modulated Carrier Waves (FMCW),
is discussed in [42], with reference to radar systems, and it is
based on frequency sweeps. The basic idea of this approach is
to estimate the ToF indirectly, via differences in the frequency
between transmitted and received signals. FMCW is based on
a given number of rounds, being the final result the median of
the results provided by single rounds. Assume that f0 is the
starting frequency and f1 is the ending frequency, while Ts is
the time needed by the transmitter to span the spectrum range
from f0 to f1 in linear time at a pre-defined speed. At a given
time, the transmitting device (i.e., the speaker) emits a sound
on a frequency, that will be received by the receiving device
on a given frequency. Defining ∆f the frequency shift, i.e., the
difference between the transmitting and receiving frequency,
then the ToF, namely ∆t, can be computed as in the following
Eq. 10.
∆t =
∆f
f1 − f0 · Ts. (10)
Note that, Eq. 10 does not contain the reception timestamps,
but the transmitting and receiving frequency. Given that the
transmitting frequency is chosen by the transmitter while the
receiving frequency can be precisely estimated via standard
FFT, the resulting accuracy can be highly improved. Once the
ToF is obtained, the distance device-user can be obtained as
in the following Eq. 11.
d = c ·∆t. (11)
While the solutions discussed above will be further discussed
throughout the paper, many other techniques to achieve source
localization using acoustic signals are available. We refer the
interested readers to the contributions already available in
the literature, surveying methods for acoustic source localiza-
tion [1], [43], [44].
8III. AUDIO CHANNELS FOR TWO-FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we provide details on the use of audio
channels as a second factor for the authentication of a user
to a system or a device. The background on multi-factor
authentication technique is provided in Section III-A, while
the literature overview and the comparisons are provided in
Section III-B.
A. Background
Two Factor Authentication (TFA) techniques are becoming
increasingly pervasive and diffused in the last years, driven by
ever increasing password leakage events1 [45]. In addition to
traditional password-based mechanisms, Two Factor Authenti-
cation (TFA) techniques adds a registered token in possession
of the user to further enforce authentication and verify that
the user credentials have not been leaked. Nowadays, TFA is
successfully adopted in the context of online banking [46],
enterprise access [47], and mobile social networks [48], re-
sorting to dedicated private solutions or commercial services,
such as Encap Security [49], Duo [50] and Google 2-step
verification [51], to name a few.
The most widespread form of two-factor authentication
is based on the use of electronic tokens, uniquely tied to
the owner, such as smartphones. In the first phase, the user
inserts its credentials. After successful verification of the
credentials, the server in charge of the authentication generates
a One Time Password (OTP) and delivers it to the user. The
OTP is then used, in different forms, to provide a unique
response to the server and further validate the possession of a
secondary device. For instance, in case the electronic token is
a smartphone, the OTP is delivered via SMS to the registered
telephone number and the user is requested to insert it as it
is received. The diagram in Fig. 7 highlights the described
interactions.
Fig. 7. Two-Factor Authentication: example of the interactions. In the first
phase, the user performs the login using its credentials. Then, to further verify
its identity, the server delivers a OTP to the mobile phone registered with the
user, and it evaluates the reply provided by the user. If it matches the expected
output, the physical individual behind the machine has both the credentials
and the mobile phone registered by the user. Thus, it is authenticated.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of data breaches
While the security offered by TFA techniques is undoubt-
edly higher than traditional mechanisms based on credentials
only, its adoption, optional in most of the cases, is still not dif-
fused. Indeed, most users still prefer the single authentication
shot, mainly because of the extra effort required by legacy TFA
techniques, always requiring explicit user interactions and not
suitable for blind or visually impaired users [52], [53].
These drawbacks have motivated significant efforts in the
last years, both by industries and academia, to develop more
usable TFA schemes, eventually requiring zero interactions
from the user. While some solutions based on the use of the
Bluetooth [54] and Near Field Communication (NFC) [55]
technologies exist, they require the involved devices to feature
a shared alternative RF communication technology, not always
available in modern devices [56].
In this context, the audio communication channel can provide
an effective answer. Indeed, elements such as microphones and
speakers are widely accepted, and already present in several
devices, ranging from regular laptops to ultimate wearables.
B. Literature Overview
An early but successful approach to the use of audio for TFA
was provided in [57], leveraging ambient sounds. The idea
behind this approach is to demonstrate that the two involved
parties, i.e., the client requesting authentication and the server
in charge of authenticating requests, are in each other proxim-
ity, i.e., in the same physical environment. The resulting TFA
mechanism, namely Sound-Proof, does not require any further
user interaction, as the second factor for authentication is
automatically enforced by triggering simultaneous registration
of ambient sounds from the browser and the phone. The two-
sides registrations of the ambient sounds are compared on the
phone and, if significant similarities are found, the proximity
of the client is established and the authentication is verified.
The similarity between the two audio recordings/snippets is
established via the similarity score, as outlined in Section II-D.
Thus, the two parties access the audio channel only once, for
quasi-simultaneous recordings. Then, the browser delivers its
audio to the smartphone, via a regular data connection, for au-
dio file comparison. This architectural choice is mainly applied
due to privacy concerns. Indeed, if the evaluation of the audio
recordings takes place on the server, a potentially malicious
server could have access to the ambient sounds registered by
the users, leaking sensitive information. Instead, Sound-Proof
moves the comparison on the smartphone, while the server
is only informed about the output of such operation. Sound-
Proof only leverages ambient sounds, easily modifiable by
a malicious third-party. Indeed, an adversary can deliberately
make the phone create a given sound, or wait for the phone
to emit a specific sound, such as a ring, a notification or an
alarm sound. In these cases, the ambient audio fingerprint is
indeed easily predictable, and it would allow an adversary to
overcome physical barriers to provide a successful attack. This
is the rationale supporting the Sound-Danger attack disclosed
in [58], where the authors discuss several smart attacks via
induced sounds on the phones, leading to a maximum of
83.2% efficacy in compromising user accounts leveraging the
Sound-Proof technique.
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tack was provided in [59], with the assistance of a smart
wearable device. In this scheme, namely Listening-Watch, the
browser generates a random (i.e., unpredictable) audio signal,
that is registered by the phone and the wearable device.
The login succeeds if the audio recording on the wearable
device contains a specific pattern and is similar enough to
the recording of the browser, thus ensuring the proximity of
the wearable to the browser. The similarity between the two
recordings is established via the Similarity Score, as in [57].
The performance of Listening-Watch have been evaluated in
an office environment, with different distances between the
wearable and the browser, i.e., benign (30 cm), intimate (50
cm) and personal (from 50cm to 1 m), as well as with different
levels of the audio signal, i.e., full volume (100% of the
scale, 79 dBA), average volume (75% of the volume, 74 dBA)
and low volume (50%, 67 dBA). A potential weakness of
the Listening-Watch technique is to leverage audible sounds,
emitted on purpose by the speakers. This could create potential
usability issues, especially when the user needs to perform
the login in specific areas, such as a library or during a
talk. This issue is overcome by the authors in [60], em-
ploying ultrasounds ([18-22] kHz). The resulting technique,
namely SoundAuth, does not disturb the surrounding audio
environment. In addition, it employs the SVM technique for
the audio comparison, resulting in a higher level of accuracy
especially in attack situations. The security of SoundAuth has
been evaluated directly against [57] in different environments,
including an office, a desk with underlying music, a lecture
and underlying TV audio noises. Thanks to the introduction of
the SVM classifier, SoundAuth is characterized by lower levels
of False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rate, leading
to better performances.
Recently, the authors in [61] proposed DoubleEcho, a new
context-based co-presence verification scheme that is effective
in verifying that two (or more) devices are located in the
same physical context. To this aim, DoubleEcho leverages
acoustic Room Impulse Response (RIR), i.e., a time-domain
representation of the modifications of a particular source signal
at a given distance from the source in a particular physical
location. Being dependant on both sound wave propagation
properties and shapes and materials from the enclosure, the
RIR is very difficult to be imitated or reproduced when not in
the same physical environment of the participating devices.
In this scheme, the devices initiate the recordings of the
audio environment only when they are triggered by one of the
participating entities, and they acquire audio samples for about
2 seconds. Given that the recording captures any sound from
the surrounding environment within a half meter distance, the
scheme could be not fully privacy-preserving: in fact, chances
are that the recordings include background information, that
could lead to the identification of the environment where the
devices are, or to the leakage of additional private information.
The scheme has been extensively evaluated, considering dif-
ferent smartphones and tablet brands, and a variety of public
and private environments (including offices, kitchen, corridor,
classroom, meeting rooms, to name a few). DoubleEcho
significantly improves the state-of-the-art in the mitigation of
context-based context manipulation attacks, requiring a MITM
attacker to be less than 50 cm apart from the intercepted
devices. For distances less than 50 cm, given that successful
co-located MITM attacks are still possible, the protection is
delegated to the authentication of the channel between the
involved devices, that can be either Bluetooth, NFC, or WiFi.
Audible sounds are also used in the recent proposal by the
authors in [62]. In this contribution, the authors proposed a
TFA technique to strengthen the authentication of a wireless
key-fob to a car, leveraging ambient sounds to overcome
relay attacks. More in detail, at the reception of a wireless
input from the remote key, the car produces random sounds
in the audible frequency range, and both of the involved
entities record the audio environment. The key delivers its
recording to the car, where it is compared against the locally
recorded sound context, using the similarity score metric. If
the two recordings are similar enough, the key is successfully
authenticated; otherwise, it is rejected. The method has been
evaluated both in an office and in a real car-parking scenario,
with a minimum Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.0013. It is worth
noting that, as for the proposal by the authors in [57], the
reliance on audible sounds exposes the method to the Sound-
Danger attack. In addition, when the adversary is co-located
and can retrieve the locally stored secrets from the key-fob,
the protocol is also vulnerable to Man In The Middle (MITM)
attacks. Finally, being based on ambient sounds recordings, the
protocol is also not privacy-preserving.
Despite the improvement in performance and usability, the
previous approaches still do not provide an answer for a co-
located MITM attack. Indeed, an adversary that is co-located
with the end-device can stealthily relay messages between the
two entities, bypassing the proximity check, as shown in [63]
and [64]. A solution to this attack is provided by the Proximity-
Proof scheme, described in [65]. It overcomes the co-located
MITM attack through the extraction of the physical-layer
fingerprints of the speaker and the microphone, thus authen-
ticating the device involved in the communication. Thus, the
TFA is approved not only if the audio environment similarity is
verified, but also if the speaker and the microphone fingerprints
are matched against the well-known profile stored at the
server-side. The fingerprints of the microphone and the speaker
are created by evaluating the effect of the transmitter and
the receiver on transmission at a given frequency, spanning
from 18.1 kHz to 20 kHz, as detailed in [66]. More iterations
further refine the process, creating a more accurate fingerprint.
The drawback of the fingerprint usually stems from the large
number of audio samples required to establish the authenticity
of the involved devices. Indeed, while the other approaches de-
scribed above use only a single audio access for each involved
device, in Proximity-Proof the phone speaker continuously
delivers the virtual packet for m ≥ 1 times, where m is a
pre-defined parameter. The second-factor login is validated
only if the login browser can establish the authenticity of
the remote device with a probability (1 − p)m, p being the
probability that the packet can be successfully decoded. As
in [60], Proximity-Proof leverages inaudible sounds, coupling
them with the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
(OFDM) technique and the ON-OFF modulation scheme,
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while a simple Euclidean Distance method is used for audio
comparison.
Tab. III wraps up the above discussion and summarizes
the most important features of the described approaches. It is
worth noting that the performance of the described approaches
are reported using either the EER, or the percentage of False
Positive and True Negative, or the Overall Error Rate (ER).
C. Lessons Learned
Our study, summarized by the comparison in Tab. III,
highlights some important lessons learned, discussed in the
following.
• Reliance on Additional Communication Technologies.
First, we notice that a common feature of all the dis-
cussed approaches is to couple the audio channel with
another (trusted) communication technology: this is used
to transfer the audio recording to the device that is in
charge of the comparison, and this step cannot be avoided
or replaced. In some cases, such as in [61], the auxiliary
communication technology is used also to protect against
classical attacks against authentication protocols, such as
MITM attacks.
• Protection Against Relay Attacks. The schemes dis-
cussed in Section III-B are based only on the use of
the audio channel. Thus, the protection against MITM
attacks, such as relay attacks, is typically delegated to the
additional communication technology used to exchange
data between the two devices. Alternatively, the actual
literature also provides several Multi-Factor Authentica-
tion (MFA) schemes, combining the audio channel with
additional sensing modes. As described by the authors
in [67], pure audio-based schemes could be vulnerable
against relay attacks, where an active adversary relays
messages between two users, cheating them about the
sharing of the same physical context. In this scenario,
combining the audio channel with further sensing modes,
such as WiFi, GPS, and Bluetooth could increase the co-
presence assurance, and thus, the robustness of authenti-
cation schemes. An example in this direction is the work
by the authors in [67], where the authors experimentally
demonstrated that combining multiple sources improves
the robustness of authentication schemes if compared
with the use of the audio-only mode. By using the MCC
statistical measure (with values between −1 and 1), the
audio-only mode achieved values of 0.715, while fusing it
with Bluetooth and GPS improves the performance up to
values of MCC of 0.978. In the following contribution in
[68], the same authors integrated their solution in a real-
world application, namely BlueProximity, and evaluated
the effectiveness of the resulting system against relay
attacks.
• Privacy Leakage. We also remark that, while being ef-
fective and valuable approaches, Listening-Watch, Sound-
Auth, and Proximity-Proof trade-off protection against
active attacks with privacy. Indeed, moving the generation
of the sound on the server enables it not only to assess the
similarity of the audio recordings, but also to further use
the collected audio recordings. Potential privacy leakages
can emerge if the server is curious, i.e., it looks for sounds
leading to the identification of the ambient where the
user is located, extracting sensitive information. We also
highlight that potential privacy leakages are increased
when multiple sensing modalities are used.
• Performance Issues. Finally, as experimentally demon-
strated by the authors in [69], the effectiveness of audio-
based TFA schemes is strongly dependent on the par-
ticular physical context where they are applied. For in-
stance, considering the Sound-Proof scheme proposed in
[57], the authors in [69] discovered very different values
of EERs not only in different physical contexts (e.g.,
car, static office, and office with mobile heterogeneous
devices), but also when each physical context is in a
different condition. For instance, when deployed in a
car, Sound-Proof achieves an equal error rate of 0.071
in a city scenario, while its performance drops down
to EER values of 0.124 when the car is parked, by
using the same setup of the protocol parameters. Thus,
the deployment of audio-based TFA schemes should be
carefully evaluated by the system administrator based on
the particular operational context, and its main parameters
should be carefully tuned to maximize its performance.
IV. AUDIO CHANNELS FOR SECURE DEVICE PAIRING
In this section, we shed lights on the use of audio channels
for secure device pairing between devices. The background
on the device pairing technique is provided in Section IV-A,
while the literature overview and the comparison between the
discussed approaches are provided in Section IV-B.
A. Background
The research area widely known as Secure Device Pairing
refers to the authentication of unfamiliar devices, i.e., the
bootstrapping of secure communication between two wireless
and possibly constrained devices, in a way to be robust against
eavesdropping and MITM attacks [70]. Common pairing oper-
ations are, e.g., the association of a Bluetooth mouse, keyboard
or headset with a laptop or another communication equipment,
or the coupling of a smartwatch with a handheld device.
The best-known approach to solve such a problem is the
standard Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol. In the DH scheme,
two entities sharing no prior secrets can establish a shared key
resorting to exponentiation operations [71]. However, because
of the lack of any shared knowledge, the authentication of
involved parties is missing, and thus, MITM attacks are
possible. This is the reason why several enhancements of the
DH protocol have been proposed, leading to authenticated DH
schemes [72].
However, in the context of Secure Device Pairing, tradi-
tional cryptography-based solutions are typically unsuitable.
Indeed, the involved devices do not share anything: there is
not any shared secret, no Certification Authority (CA) nor
11
Scheme Feature AudioAnalysis
Strategy
Sound-
Danger
attack
robust-
ness
Privacy
pre-
serv.
Number
of
Audio
Accesses
Co-
located
MITM
attacks
robustness
Performance
Evaluation Perf.
Env. Dist.
[57] Ambient
Sound
Correlation
(Sim.
Score)
7 X 1 per
device 7
Office,
Music,
Lec-
ture,
TV
Desk,
Pocket EER = 0.07
[59] Audible
Sound
Correlation
(Sim.
Score)
X 7 1 per
device 7
Office Intimate,
Personal,
Benign
EER < 0.01
[60] Ultrasound SVM X 7 1 per
device
7 Office,
Music,
Lec-
ture,
TV
Desk,
Pocket EER = 0.14
[61] Audible
Sound
Room
Impulse
Resp.
X 7 1 per
device
7 Office,
Kitchen,
Corri-
dor,
Class-
room,
Rooms,
et al.
Room
area
FP, TN ∈
{0.089−
0.106}
[62] Audible
Sound
Correlation
(Sim.
Score)
7 7 1 per
device
7 Office,
Parking
Personal,
Benign
EER = 0.001
[65] Ultrasound Euclidean
Distance
X 7 m per
device
X Office N/A
ER = 0.02
(at 50cm)
TABLE III
COMPARISON BETWEEN TFA APPROACHES BASED ON SHORT-RANGE AUDIO CHANNELS.
Trusted Third Party (TTP) to leverage for assisted operations.
As suggested by the authors in [73], a theoretical solution
perfectly suitable for this case would be the establishment of
a common standard Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), trusted by
all the devices. However, this would require all manufacturers
to agree on a set of features, as well as endless revision
processes, leading to large manufacturing delays. Thus, the
human involvement in the process is necessary to confirm
that the two devices are indeed communicating, and no other
party is impersonating one of the legitimate entities. Given the
cited premises, a challenging problem in this context refers to
minimize the effort of humans in pairing operations.
Many solutions are available in the literature, already sum-
marized by the authors in [74] and [72]. Common solutions are
based on Out Of Band (OOB) channels, such as a camera or
infrared links. However, these schemes could face deployment
issues in some specific contexts, e.g., when the users are visu-
ally impaired, there are adversarial ambient light conditions,
the area is security-sensitive (military areas) or, finally, the
involved devices are not equipped with the necessary external
modules, such as a camera or an infrared module.
In these scenarios, the usage of the audio channel could
provide enhanced and peculiar features, emerging as a compli-
mentary OOB channel to achieve a secure association between
unfamiliar devices.
B. Literature Review
The idea of using the audio channel for secure device
pairing was launched by the authors in [75], through the Loud
and Clear (L&C) scheme. It uses audio to provide human-
assisted device authentication, relying on the use of the spoken
natural language. Specifically, L&C covers four possible use-
cases, three of them are based on the emission of an audible
and syntactically correct sequence by at least one of the
devices. If the other entity involved in the pairing process has
a speaker, too, it reproduces the detected word and the human
has only to compare the two sequences, and to decide if they
represent the same word. In case the other device does not have
a speaker, the corresponding word is displayed as a text on a
screen, and the user has to compare the text with the emitted
sound. To reduce the number of audio channel accesses, L&C
represents the authentication object as a syntactically correct
text (usually non-sense), hashed to generate a fixed bit-string
of H bits. Then, the hash is divided into 10-bit sections, and
each section is mapped on a word. Thus, H/10 words are
emitted, resulting in a completion time of about 32 seconds.
Even if the scheme leverages an alternative communication
channel between the two devices, no security assumption is
made on this channel. Note also that the audio communication
channel is not secret nor authenticated: thus, eavesdropping
is always possible. The assumption about the underlying
secrecy of the audio communication channel is instead at the
basis of the proposal in [76], using a low-frequency audio
channel to perform the pairing between an Implanted Medical
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Device (IMD) and a tag reader sharing an unsecured Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) connection. Given the audio
channel is assumed to be a secret as well as authenticated
OOB (AS-OOB), the key is transferred directly via audio in
approximately 2 seconds, leading to acoustic eavesdropping
attacks if a microphone is placed very near to the human body.
Starting from the proposal by [75], a large number of audio-
based approaches were proposed for devices pairing.
Another pairing protocol for constrained wireless devices
was proposed in [77], with reference to devices featuring at
least a screen and a microphone. The proposed approach,
namely Beep-Blink, is based on the comparison of audio-visual
patterns at the two sides of the communication to achieve
secure device pairing. One of the two devices, featuring
audio generation capabilities, encodes via audio a first Short
Authenticated String (SAS) and an audio termination string,
received by the second device. The other device acknowledges
the reception of the two sounds through the blinking of a green
led for the first string and a red led for the termination string.
The user has just to compare the approximate matching of
the two actions, i.e., beeping and blinking, to establish the
association between the two devices. Indeed, the security of
the scheme is based on the underlying security of the SAS
strings.
A simple yet effective technique for secure device pairing
on smartphones is provided in [41] and further refined in [78].
These contributions proposed the Point& Connect scheme,
namely P&C, suitable for the pairing of smartphones. Specif-
ically, it leverages a collaborative scheme based on a distance
measure between involved devices based on acoustic signals,
thus requiring only a speaker and a microphone. Indeed, in
a scenario where multiple devices coexist, P&C allows for
the selection of the target device through an intention-based
mechanism where the initiator shakes and points his/her device
towards the selected target destination device. The pairing
intention is captured via an acoustic-based distance measuring
technique, where the initiator emits two sequential chirp sound
signals. At the receiver side, the intended receiver will be the
device exhibiting the largest distance reduction, as it is on the
Line of Sight (LoS) to the initiator’s position. This can be
detected via the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI),
pairwise ranging techniques or solutions based on the Time of
Arrival (ToA). The proposed technique exhibits outstanding
performance (error rate 0) when the positioning of the audio
source is at an angle α = 0 to the receiving device. Otherwise,
the performance degrade quickly.
The audio channel is also employed in [79], as an OOB
channel to assist pairing using an unsecured wireless commu-
nication channel. In the proposed approach, namely UbiComp,
the short-range audio channel is used to convey information
to verify cryptography elements delivered on the other, unse-
cured, wireless channel, essentially to guarantee the physical
proximity of the end-device emitting the audio signal. A total
number of 2 messages are delivered by the target device on the
audio communication channel, consisting of a random number
and a public key, and requiring 1.5s in total to be completely
delivered, assuming a RSA key pair of 1024 bit. Of course,
MITM attacks are possible, given that the public key of the
devices is not authenticated. This is why the human is involved
in the loop to verify that the sound is effectively emitted by
the intended remote device.
Another solution leveraging the audio channel for pairing
is the HAPADEP protocol [73]. It consists of two consecutive
phases. In the transfer phase, triggered when the user pushes
a button, one of the two devices transmits its cryptography
materials (e.g, the public key) to the other one. Receiving this
information, the remote device transforms the key in an audio
sequence and plays it. The other device records and decodes
the audio sequence, accessing the key. The audio transmission
lasts for 3 seconds and, if the pairing is bidirectional, the
scheme is repeated with inverted roles. During the following
Verification Phase, the user is called to verify that the two
sounds emitted by the involved devices are the same, and to
press a key if a match is verified.
Extending the approach in [75], the same authors in [80]
proposed a variant based on pure audio, avoiding the need
for an auxiliary wireless channel. The basic idea leveraged by
this technique is that if an attacker enforces a MITM attack by
encoding a self-generated string, the legitimate user can detect
the audio source and stop the execution of the protocol.
However, the contributions [81] and [4] confuted experi-
mentally the idea that MITM attacks on the audio channel
can be always detected because of the human perception
of the communication channel.Hence, in [81], the authors
demonstrated that systems based on self-jamming cannot fully
reliably detect the presence of signals injected by a malicious
adversary that is co-located with the victim, i.e., they are not
able to face the so-called overshadowing attack. It is worth
noting that facing the overshadowing attacks is more chal-
lenging than dealing with co-located MITM attacks described
in Section III in the context of TFA techniques. Indeed, while
solutions in the context of TFA can leverage shared secrets
or certified fingerprints, this is not possible for the pairing
scenario, where the devices are unknown to each other.
Further proofs of the effectiveness of the overshadowing
attack are discussed in [4], where the authors also propose
some countermeasures. The most effective is based on some
security symbols, embedded within the transmitted data at a
random location, such that the bit-string size of a generic
security symbol corresponds to a single symbol in the bit-
stream. For each symbol period, the samples above a given
threshold represent security symbols, and they will be verified
and discarded by the receiver. The remaining ones will be
considered as data, to be demodulated and decoded. Thus, if an
attacker transmits further data, it is very likely that the signal
energy over the particular symbol will overcome the threshold
and it will be discarded, causing a meaningless Denial of
Service.
It is worth noting that, contrary to TFA schemes discussed in
Section III, in the case of the audio-assisted pairing approaches
discussed above the type of audio signal involved in the
process is in the audible audio range. This is needed to
allow the external user to confirm the correctness of the
process. Contrariwise, some other approaches got rid of human
involvement. As for the case of [78], a different strategy was
proposed by the authors in [82], that aimed at eliminating
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the human from the loop. It proposed AdHocPairing, an
audio-based spontaneous device pairing application leveraging
ambient sounds for secure key generation. The two devices
synchronously record the ambient sounds for a duration of
6375 milliseconds, and they extract a fingerprint of such
a record by taking its FFT in 33 sub-bands. To align the
registration of the ambient sounds in two close but different
locations, they map the recorded audio fingerprint on the
code space of an error correction code, using the widest
known principle of the Hamming Distance to identify the
code-word that best matches the recorded audio fingerprint.
One of the two devices, elected as the transmitter, use the
best-matching key to encrypt a message, and sends it to the
receiver. The receiver, having calculated the key employing
the same principle, is then able to decrypt the information.
In case it fails, it continues for up 10 attempts, taking every
time the best key from the remaining ones having the shortest
Hamming distance. While eliminating the human from the
loop and resorting to the ambient audio-only, this scheme
is more exposed against MITM attack, trading off security
for usability. In addition, it is defined only for bi-directional
pairing, while its specification in the context of unidirectional
communications is not defined.
The authors in [83] provided a thorough study on how the
audio channel state recorded by the devices can be used to
generate a shared cryptographic secret between two devices
in proximity, with minimal guessing probability by third-
parties. Specifically, they proposed to extract audio fingerprints
from synchronized recordings of mobile devices, to correct
their hamming distance from specific pre-defined code-words
using fuzzy cryptography schemes, and then to utilize these
fingerprints as the seed for cryptographic keys generation
among the involved devices. To provide a sufficient level
of entropy to the key to be generated, this approach splits
the full audio recordings, lasting 6.375 s, into 17 frames of
identical length. Then, the FFT of each frame is computed and
further divided into 33 frequency bands, where the respective
energy values are computed. Overall, this operation results in a
512-bit fingerprint. Despite the effectiveness of the described
approach, a 100 % match among fingerprints generated by
different devices is very hard to happen. Indeed, the involved
devices are characterized by different hardware, are separated
by a small distance and they are not perfectly synchronized,
thus introducing discrepancies in the fingerprint generation
process. Thus, a fuzzy commitment scheme is implemented
via Reed-Solomon codes, to generate a common secret among
the involved devices. Using the combination of these strate-
gies, the authors demonstrated how the ambient fingerprinting
can be used for fingerprint-based authentication, even in the
presence of an active attacker, able to disrupt the shared audio
channel inserting audio messages on purpose. Specifically, the
authors found that a minimum amount of 75% of correct
bits in the reconstructed fingerprint are necessary to pair two
communicating devices while, at the same time, providing
sufficient security guarantees against eavesdroppers experienc-
ing different audio contexts. A vast experimental campaign
is provided to confirm the theoretical results, including office
scenarios, situations in which attackers easily imitate the audio
environments, and other busy environments.
Small variations of the approach in [83] have been de-
scribed by the authors in [84] and [85]. The contribution
in [84] focused on the practical issues related to hardware,
environment, and time synchronization, necessary to achieve
secret key generation via ambient audio fingerprints, and it
provided several alternative options for features generation,
as well as experimental results. The authors in [85], instead,
exploited speech recognition techniques on free-form spoken
interactions between the owner and the target device to identify
precisely the devices to pair. Further, they restrict the pairing
only to devices in proximity. The protocol was specified in two
forms, based on the presence (or not) of a central authority, and
it took up to a maximum of 4 seconds to complete, depending
on the speed and length of the sentence used by the owner.
While previous approaches only rely on audio, another class
of approaches extend the same concept over the whole context
shared by co-present devices, coupling the audio channel with
additional sensors readings.
The authors in [86] introduced the concept of audio fin-
gerprinting, i.e., the unique ambient features characterizing
a particular physical environment over time. Specifically,
the approach proposed in this contribution combined audio-
based key generation and a sensor-based approach, using
the luminosity features of the surrounding environment. This
concept is strengthened by the relationship with the time
dimension: in fact, two devices can complete the pairing
process only if the ambient fingerprint computed over the
audio and the luminosity context is similar over a long time-
span, i.e., multiple consecutive acquisitions. This innovative
concept, namely Sustained Co-Presence, is integrated with a
fuzzy commitment scheme, that can lead the two devices to
estimate the same shared key only if, after the first initial
pairing, they continue to share the same ambient context over
the time. We notice that the scheme leverages an auxiliary
secure communication channel to successfully and securely
perform the fuzzy commitment scheme. In addition, acoustic
eavesdropping is possible and effective to partially break the
protocol, even if it should be coupled with the eavesdropping
of the luminosity level in the underlying physical environment.
The authors of this contribution report similarity values up
to 91.8% for the audio channel, and of the 95.0% for the
luminosity sensor readings, making the proposed solution an
effective tool for the pairing of wearable and IoT devices.
The combination of ambient sound and light have been used
also in [87], where the authors proposed a pairing scheme
for wearable devices not equipped with external interfaces.
Similarly to the proposal in [86], the scheme is rooted in
the comparison between ambient sound and light features
of the communicating devices, and it does not require strict
time synchronization. As a distinguishing feature, the scheme
proposed by [87] is triggered only when the user explicitly
approves it, limiting the effectiveness of context guessing
attacks. The protocol proposed in this contribution could
achieve EERs of 0.1276 by using only ambient sounds, being
however very susceptible to the underlying context features.
We recall that the actual literature provides a variety of
context-based pairing protocols, possibly implicitly using also
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the short-range audio channel as an element of the context
experienced by pairing devices. To provide a reference ex-
ample, the ambient sound is used by the authors in [88] as
part of the features characterizing the physical environment
where pairing is carried out. The protocol proposed in this
contribution, namely Perceptio, does not specifically leverage
the audio channel, as it allows two devices that do not share
any common sensor to establish a shared key leveraging the
physical context, removing any synchronization delay. Given
that this survey is focused on short-range audio channels, and
the research area of context-based pairing is just tangent to this
contribution, we refer the interested reader to the surveys in
[89] and [9] for an exhaustive list and comparison of context-
based pairing approaches.
The techniques discussed above are summarized in Tab. IV,
where differences in key characteristics of the approaches are
highlighted
C. Secret Sharing via Short-Range Audio Links
When the pairing between two or more devices can leverage
a secret, various heterogeneous techniques can be used. We
hereby mention a few techniques using the audio channel to
either share or allow the computation of a secret. Specifically,
secret sharing is a well-known technique in the literature, used
to distribute a secret between some entities in a network, such
that subsets of these entities could decode and obtain the se-
cret. For instance, if n is the total number of information pieces
(namely, shares), and k is the minimum number of shares
required to re-assemble the original information, the scheme
is said to be a (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme [90]. In
this area, the authors in [91] further introduced Audio Secret
Sharing Scheme (ASSS) techniques, leveraging short-range
audible links to achieve secret sharing. These techniques were
further studied by the authors in [92], proposing a new, secure
but ideal audio secret sharing scheme. The main difference
between a regular secret sharing scheme and an audio-based
one as the one proposed by [92] lies in the numbness of human
ears towards phase rotation of the audio signals. This property
is used to design a scheme where no computation is required
on the receiver side, i.e., on the human ear. The scheme is
also demonstrated to be secure, in the sense that exactly k
shares are required to reconstruct the signal. This work was
further optimized by the authors in [93] and [94], concerning
the security guarantees and the probability distribution used
in the encryption of the original audio secret, respectively. In
detail, it improves the result of previous works so that shares in
ASSS schemes encrypting audio secrets should have bounded
amplitude with probability 1. To achieve this objective, the
authors use a normal distribution over a bounded domain,
and evaluate the security of the resulting scheme. Finally,
it is also worth mentioning the recent contribution in [95],
further improving the state of the art by estimating the mutual
information between secret and shares in a (n, n)-threshold
ASSS.
D. Lessons Learned
The comparison summarized in Table IV highlights several
outcomes and trade-offs, each discussed below.
• AS-OOB Unsuitability. Legacy approaches leveraging
only the audio channel for secure device pairing, e.g.,
[76] and [79], were based on the AS-OOB assumption.
However, the diffusion of audio-based pairing protocols
and the large availability of computational resources on-
board of modern devices rendered this assumption simply
unfeasible. Thus, modern audio-based pairing protocols
assume that, when used, the audio channel is accessible
also to parties other than the legitimate ones.
• Acoustic Eavesdropping Vulnerability. As shown by
the summary in Table IV, due to the open nature of
the audio channel and the unsuitability of secret sharing,
all the described approaches are vulnerable to acoustic
eavesdropping attacks. Being passive and stealthy, the
adversary could simply listen to the audio channel and,
being in proximity of the involved devices, guess a large
part of the bits of the secret used for device pairing.
This vulnerability, along with the others described below,
motivated the deployment of secure auxiliary channels
between the pairing devices.
• Overshadowing and Active Attacks Vulnerability. As
shown by the summary in Table IV, the overshadowing
vulnerability discussed in [4] is an issue for all the ap-
proaches, independently from the human involvement in
the pairing process. Especially in systems based on self-
jamming, the overshadowing attack could be deployed
by skilled adversaries, leading to the poisoning of the
communication channel and a Denial of Service (DoS)
on the pairing process. The authors in [4] also described
some possible solutions to thwart overshadowing attacks,
including physical-layer solutions based on Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) techniques, and MAC-layer
ones, based on the inclusion of security symbols within
the legitimate audio signal. However, the deployability of
these solutions within secure device pairing protocols is
not straightforward, as all of them require the sharing of
secrets between the involved devices (either for the syn-
chronization of the frequency to be extracted among the
possible ones, or for the positioning of security symbols
within the audio data stream). The unsuitability of secrets
sharing also creates the possibility of other attacks, such
as relay and distance hijacking attacks. Relay attacks,
being a kind of MITM attacks, assume an adversary that
relays messages between the two involved parties, letting
them believe to share the same audio context. Similarly,
in distance hijacking attacks, the adversary jams the
legitimate communication channel between the involved
devices after the sharing of the information about the
physical context, and completes the pairing process on
behalf of one of the legitimate devices. These vulnera-
bilities, along with the acoustic eavesdropping previously
highlighted, motivated the deployment of secure auxiliary
channels between the pairing devices.
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Scheme
Feature Suitable for
Unidirect.
Pairing
Need of
AS-
OOB
Audio
Channel
Usage
Time [s]
Acoustic
Eavesdropp.
Feasibility
Subject to
Overshadowing
Auxiliary
Secure
Channels
needed
Perf.
[73] Audible
Sound
X 7 3 X X 7
ER < 0.05
[75] Audible
Sound
X 7 32 X X 7
ER = 0
(within
10 cm)
[76] Audible
Sound
X X 2 X X 7
N/A
[77] Audible
Sound
7 7 1 X X 7
ER < 0.04
[78] Ultrasound X 7 1.4 X X 7
ER = 0
(at α = 0)
[79] Audible
Sound
X X 1.5 X X 7
ER = 0
(within
30 cm)
[80] Audible
Sound
X 7 3.4 X X X
ER = 0
(within
30 cm)
[82],
[83],
[84],
[85]
Ambient
Sound
7 7 6.575 X X X ER <
0.001
(indoor env.)
[86] Ambient
Sound
X 7 f · w per
device
X X X EER =
0.12
(office env.)
[87] Ambient
Sound
X 7 6 X X X EER =
0.1276
TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN PAIRING PROTOCOLS LEVERAGING AUDIO CHANNELS.
• Secure Auxiliary Channels. Pairing operations between
unknown devices should not leverage any secret pre-
shared between involved parties. At the same time, the
security of the audio channel could be broken by the
passive or the active attacks described above. Therefore,
most of the available solutions leverage secure auxiliary
communication channels to improve the overall robust-
ness of the pairing scheme. Thus, in the first phase,
the devices use the highest layers of the protocol stack
and the auxiliary channel (Bluetooth, WiFi, and others)
to establish a secure communication link. Then, the co-
presence is established using the audio channel.
• Hardware Heterogeneity. In real deployments, the de-
vices taking part in the pairing process could be very
heterogeneous, being different not only in the number
and the nature of embedded sensors, but also in the
hardware chips providing sensing capabilities. These
considerations are at the basis of several context-based
pairing approaches, relying on physical properties that
are invariant compared to the configuration of the pairing
device. In this context, the microphones sensing the state
of the audio channel could provide a different intensity
and timing of a particular event. Thus, pairing approaches
leveraging the audio channel should be able to remove
time and intensity differences between pairing devices.
• Usability. Most of the analyzed approaches experimen-
tally demonstrated that comparing the audio signals over
an increased time improves the performance of the solu-
tion, reducing the overall error rate. However, increasing
the audio channel usage time leads to an increase in the
time needed for the pairing process, reducing the overall
usability and transparency of the solution on the users’
side. Thus, a trade-off is necessary between security and
usability.
• Additional Sensing Sources. As also highlighted in the
discussion related to TFA schemes, the actual trend is
to leverage not only the audio channel for secure device
pairing, but also additional sensing sources, such as light,
GPS, Bluetooth, to name a few. The combination of all
these data is leading to a switch from a pure audio-based
secure device pairing to a context-based secure device
pairing, where the audio is an element of the surrounding
context shared by the devices. Many scientific contribu-
tions, such as [96], demonstrated the increased robustness
of methods based on multiple sensing sources, through
context-based proofs of presence that are hard to guess
by adversaries.
Despite this evolution, we believe that the study of pure
audio-based schemes is still valuable, as the audio context
stands as one of the most important elements defining the
physical context shared by co-present devices at the time
of the pairing. Thus, strengthening the co-presence de-
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tection and increasing the robustness against well-known
attacks on the audio channel (including eavesdropping
and overshadowing) are still crucial requirements for
any context-based approach leveraging the audio envi-
ronment.
V. DEVICE AUTHORIZATION AND USER VERIFICATION
VIA SHORT-RANGE AUDIO
In this section, we analyze the techniques available in
the literature that use short-range audio to provide device
authorization and user verification. Section V-A provides the
background, while Section V-B reviews the current literature
and provides final comparisons.
A. Background
Authorization is a fundamental security service that deals
with the problem of identifying if an entity has the right to
execute a given function on a given device [31]. A large variety
of solutions exist in the literature, tailored for each system
or network to be secured [97]. In this section, we focus on
authorization mechanisms leveraging short-range audio links
to grant or deny access to a system and physical devices.
A first area where audio is used to achieve authorization is
in the user registration or authentication to websites, where it is
crucial to distinguish a human being from automated software,
namely a bot. This is a crucial task in many applications, in-
cluding registration of users to websites, authorized responses
from websites and command executions on actuators. This
is a very common issue especially for website developers,
where correct identification of humans and bots can achieve
a valuable defense strategy [98]. Throughout this section, we
refer to this issue as user verification.
Traditional mechanisms to distinguish between humans and
bots were tailored for user registration to websites, and they
are based on Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell
Computers and Humans Aparts (CAPTCHAs), widely used
nowadays when registering a new account to a website or
performing authentication to a known platform. CAPTCHAs
identify humans and bots by challenging them with tests that
are quite easy for humans, but hard for automatic devices.
Examples include visual CAPTCHAs, based on images or
videos, text-based or pointing-based ones, where the user has
to click with its mouse in a specific location on the screen [99].
Another strategy is to recur to short-range audio challenges.
Short-range audio is particularly effective for visually impaired
individuals or people with motor limitations, as well as when
the verifier is a speech recognition system, whose only inter-
faces with the external world are a microphone and a speaker.
B. Literature Review
In the context of user registration and authentication to
websites, many different audio-based CAPTCHAs have been
proposed, both based on human speech and ambient sounds,
and a comprehensive overview of these strategies can be found
in [12]. Without loss of generality, they assume a scenario
in which the server is the verifier. It generates a complex
sound, having features that are easy to be recognized by
humans but hard to be identified by machines. The remote
party, namely the prover, has to prove to be a human by
providing an interpretation or decoding of the challenge.
The overview in [12] tackles most of the solutions where
the authentication/registration server is the verifier, and the
user is the prover. However, many contributions in the last
years have demonstrated the weaknesses of most audio-based
CAPTCHA solutions [100]. Indeed, as reported in [101] the
difference between human and computers audio capabilities is
very small, much smaller than the difference between human
and computer visual processing capabilities, and this makes it
hard to design audio-based CAPTCHAs (further details will be
provided in Section VI). The most successful recent techniques
are provided by the authors in [102], where the authors
proposed two different audio CAPTCHA schemes exploiting
differences in auditory perception between humans and com-
puters. The first technique explores the auditory perception
of humans, especially when multiple simultaneous speakers
occur. Indeed, humans defeat computers in isolating several
similar acoustic streams from a mixture of signals, despite
BSS solutions are even more closing the gap. To leverage this
gap in the design of an improved audio CAPTCHA, multiple
mixtures of speech signals are incorporated into an audio
signal, by partially superimposing different words. To still
maintain audio decodability features for humans, a variable
time delay is introduced between two different words, and
all speech pauses are filled with noise speech by multiple
talkers. In the second approach, the authors exploit differences
in humans’ understanding of the natural language. The words
in the CAPTCHA are now produced without any noise,
and words are selected such as the probability confusion is
minimal. To confuse attackers, artificially generated non-sense
speech sounds are randomly inserted in the sequence, and
the users are challenged to recognize meaningful words from
semantically incorrect speech sequences. Note that both of the
proposed techniques do not resort to any other communication
channel rather than the audio means.
Also in the context of voice assistants, authorization is a
crucial task. Many commercial voice assistants are available
nowadays, including Alexa, Siri, Cortana, and Google Now,
to name a few. Indeed, they are extremely convenient in
scenarios where other kinds of interaction (visual-based or
touch-based) require more effort or are unfeasible, such as in
Driving Assistance Tools. Thus, ensuring that only authorized
sources can trigger voice assistance tools is cumbersome. To
provide a further authorization layer, the authors in [103]
presented VAuth, a system guaranteeing that the voice assistant
executes commands coming only from the voice of the owner.
At the triggering of the voice assistant, the system collect
accelerometer data from a wearable component mounted at
the user’s side, and it correlates them with signals coming
from the microphone, via the MFCC. Only if there is a match
with the profile of the user’s voice, the command is issued.
Another application domain where audio channels are es-
sential is in the context of audio-controlled Internet of Things
(IoT) devices. In this dynamic ecosystem, voice interfaces
are often provided to simplify the usage of IoT devices
in the environment, e.g., by enabling voice-triggered lights
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turn on, windows closing or opening, doors locking, and
many other automated activities. Despite these devices are
usually protected by ensuring the physical proximity of the
triggering voice commands, often this is not enough. To protect
audio assistants from unauthorized usage, the authors in [104]
propose an authentication mechanism based on (at least) two
microphones deployed randomly in the area. The main idea of
the proposed system (2MA) is to locate the source of any audio
source in the scenario, and to authorize the execution only of
voice commands whose source is close to the user’s mobile
device. This is achieved by combining distance bounding,
via standard Direction Of Arrival (DOA) mechanisms, and
audio similarity, via a RSH function. In this case, another
communication channel is used between the IoT device and the
Mobile Device to exchange information. Thus, an initialization
and key establishment phase are necessary.
Maintaining the focus on audio-controlled IoT devices, the
authors in [19] provided a strategy to protect constrained
devices from unauthorized actions triggering. Specifically, the
authors tackled the issue of the triggering of IoT devices via
other devices in the same area emitting sounds via electronic
speakers. To distinguish between a human or an electronic
speaker, they identify the presence of the sub-bass frequency
excitation typical of any modern speaker. Aside, they also
design a system filtering the noise of the environment, and
computing experimental thresholds to decide if a human or
a device is issuing voice commands. Thus, even assuming
the attacker can manipulate audio commands, the electronic
speaker will be always detected.
An overview of the approaches discussed above is provided
in the following Tab. V.
C. Lessons Learned
The following take-away messages can be extracted from
our discussion and comparison.
• Semantic User Identification via Audio. As highlighted
by several studies, when taking the audio as the reference
channel for authorization, differences between humans
and bots are very small. When the usage of this channel
is unavoidable (e.g., in the case of visually impaired
users), the mental skills of humans are key to distin-
guish the nature of the user. Thus, users are asked to
understand valid words within streams of characters, or
to extract meaningful information from the audible sound.
However, these operations have an impact on the overall
usability of the solution, increasing the authorization time
and overhead.
• Authorization via Co-Presence Detection. To protect
audio assistants against unauthorized use, legacy tech-
niques based on co-presence detection are used. Despite
limiting the effective usage range of these devices, the in-
tegration of such physical-layer solutions helps to assess
the effective presence of the entity issuing commands,
avoiding relay and further MITM attacks.
VI. ATTACKS VIA AUDIO
In this section, we analyze several attacks performed
through the audio channel. They are divided into active attacks,
involving the delivering of audio signals on purpose, and
passive attacks, performed by simply passively listening on the
audio channel. In Section VI-A we describe the motivations
behind these types of attacks, mainly related to exploiting
Voice Controllable Systems (VCSs). We show that such attacks
aim to achieve remote commands execution, as well as to
violate user privacy exploiting the acoustic emissions of some
devices. In Section VI-B we provide a thorough analysis of the
most representative works that exploited the audio channel for
malicious purposes, dividing them into the two aforementioned
categories: active attacks (Section VI-B1 ) and passive attacks
(Section VI-B2 ).
A. Background
The increasing diffusion of VCS, such as Voice Assistant
(VA), is changing the way people live, offering several au-
tomation functions in both the consumer and the business
realms. A VA is a software, usually installed on comput-
ers/smartphones, using different technologies including voice
recognition, speech synthesis, and Natural Language Process-
ing (NLP) to provide different smart services to the users.
Thanks to a Voice User Interface (VUI), users can access the
VAs and interact with them easily and quickly.
As shown in Fig. 8, the architecture of a VA includes (at
least) three main components: voice capture, speech recog-
nition, and command execution. The voice capture module
records ambient and speech sounds, that are usually pre-
processed and provided to the speech recognition system.
This module can identify human voices containing possible
commands, isolating them from ambient and noise sounds. Fi-
nally, the recognized commands are executed by the command
execution module [105].
Fig. 8. Typical architecture of a VCS.
A VA usually works in two different stages: activation and
recognition. The activation stage envisions that the VA con-
tinuously records ambient sounds, looking for a human voice.
Indeed, the user activates the VA by pronouncing a predefined
sentence (such us “Hey Google”, or “Alexa”). If the predefined
sentence is recognized, the VA enters the recognition mode.
Other activation methods are possible, e.g., by pressing a
physical button, or by opening a specific application. Once
entered in recognition mode, the VCS converts voices into
commands, thanks to NLP techniques.
The VCS technology is constantly evolving, and the VA
market is progressing at an even higher pace. Indeed, the
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Scheme
Verifier—
Generating
Sound
Prover—
Interpreting
Sound
Distinguishing
Feature
Auxiliary
Secure
Channel
Needed
Typical
Scenario Perf.
[102] Server Client Partial
overlapping of
words
7 User Registration
on websites Word
Accuracy up
to 90.51%
[102] Server Client Natural
Language
Processing
7 User Registration
on websites Word
Accuracy up
to 98.49%
[103] Server Client Accelerometer
Data
X Voice Assistants
Detection
Accuracy up
to 97%
[104] Client Server Multiple
Receivers
X Voice-controlled
IoT devices Detection
Accuracy up
to 97%
[19] Client Server Sub-bass over
excitation
7 Voice-controlled
IoT devices Detection
Accuracy up
to 99.95%
TABLE V
COMPARISON BETWEEN AUTHORIZATION APPROACHES BASED ON SHORT-RANGE AUDIO.
widespread adoption of VA is a key factor behind the enor-
mous growth of smart home devices and applications, with
over 275 million VA devices expected to control smart homes
by 2023, compared to the 25 million estimated in 2018 [106].
Following the rapid increase in popularity, VAs are gain-
ing more and more attention from industry and academia,
raising also important security concerns. Indeed, despite the
undoubted usefulness and practicality offered by a voice
interface, the lack of any inherent authentication mechanism is
a cause of threats to the user’s security and privacy, especially
when using earlier versions of these softwares.
B. Literature Overview
The active attacks discussed in the recent scientific literature
are mainly focused on attacking the VCSs. Indeed, these
active attacks can be performed by sending audio signals on
purpose to VCSs. These signals are neither unintelligible nor
inaudible to humans, but still recognizable by voice capturing
subsystems. Section VI-B1 provides a description of the most
important contributions in this field, while Tab. VI summarizes
and compares them. The most representative passive attacks
discussed in the literature are described in Section VI-B2.
Finally, Tab. VII highlights and cross-compares them across
their main features.
1) Active Attacks: The majority of the attacks described
below aims to cause the execution of unauthorized commands
in a target device equipped with a VCS. These commands
include malicious activities, such as data exfiltration (by send-
ing of SMS or emails), money stealing (via payment-based
SMS services), malware installation (by opening malicious
web pages and starting downloads), and possibly others.
One of the first attacks against a voice assistant has been
performed by the authors in [107], which proposed a bypassing
attack exploiting the lack of any permission necessary for
an Android application to access the phone speaker. The
adversary model involves the use of a malware to invoke
the voice assistant (Google Voice Search), bringing it to the
foreground. Then, the malware plays a pre-prepared audio file
containing specific commands, recognized and executed by the
VCS. Indeed, many critical assumptions are necessary for the
attack to be successfully executed. The victim’s smartphone
should be already infected with the malware, and the attack
could be successfully completed only if the user is away from
the phone. Indeed, if the victim is close to his smartphone,
he can notice the ongoing attack by hearing the audio played
by the malware through the speaker. Thus, he could manually
block the execution of the command. Moreover, the attack has
been tested only in a closed environment, without any external
noise.
Another pioneer contribution that explored the feasibility
of attacking a VCS using an audio signal unintelligible to
humans was discussed in [108]. Authors provided a thorough
study of the speech recognition mechanisms, investigating if
differences in the ways humans and machines detect spoken
speech could lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. They found
that these differences can be easily exploited by an adversary
to produce sounds that are recognized as a command by
VCSs, while being perceived by humans as noise other than
speech. This methodology increases the potential danger and
the feasibility of these types of attacks. Indeed, these powerful
attacks involve neither installing a malware nor performing any
further interactions with the attacker and the victim’s smart-
phone before the attack execution. Moreover, the audio signals
injected by the attacker to activate and use the VA are stealthy,
as they are unintelligible to human listeners. The attacker first
produces an audio file containing a regular voice command
that she wants to be executed on the targeted device. Then,
the audio file is provided as input to specific software, namely
an “audio mangler”. This software removes all the audio signal
features not used by the speech recognition module, but used
by a human. The authors evaluated the real feasibility of this
attack against the Google Now personal assistant, playing
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the recorded commands using speakers located about 30cm
from the targeted device. Their experiments involved several
unauthorized actions, including activating the VA (Google
Now), calling a number, sending SMS, and opening a website.
Even if this work improved the previous attacks against VCS,
some limitations are still present. These limitations involve
the audibility of the unauthorized commands and the white
box approach, which assumes some knowledge of the victim’s
speech recognition system by the attacker.
Some of these limitations have been overcome in [109].
In this paper, the authors proposed an attack against any
VCSs, using a malicious audio signal coming from outside
the victim’s smartphone. The attack is realized with a few
knowledge about the speech recognition system of the user,
and it applies to a variety of scenarios. The attack is performed
against the Google Now personal assistant software and the
open-source CMU Sphinx speech recognition system, used by
several VCSs. The authors significantly improved the state
of the art by evaluating the feasibility of this attack under
more realistic scenarios. In addition, they formalized a general
method to produce machine-understandable speech that is, at
the same time, rarely recognized by humans. The attack was
performed in an isolated room, without background noise,
playing the audio commands on a speaker located exactly
50cm from the microphone. This work practically demon-
strated the feasibility to remotely attack a VCS, by activating
a virtual assistant software and exploiting it to execute several
commands without neither authorization nor privileges in the
victim’s system. On the opposite side, these attacks use hidden
voice commands which are incomprehensible but still audible
to humans. Thus, the user might notice the ongoing attack by
hearing a noise.
To overcome this limit and increase the reach of the attack, a
completely inaudible attack has been proposed by the authors
in [105]. This objective is achieved by modulating voice
commands on ultrasonic carriers (f > 20kHz), in a way
to be inaudible to humans. The authors performed an in-
depth study on the voice capturing subsystems (composed by
microphones), investigating how they record audible sounds.
They found that electric components such as amplifiers follow
a non-linear behavior compared to the input signal features.
Then, they found the same property on real microphone
modules, observing that an attacker can exploit it to build an
ad-hoc audio signal, containing the command. The voice is
then modulated on an ultrasonic carrier right before the trans-
mission. On the reception side, the sound is correctly demod-
ulated on base-band by the receiver hardware. To demonstrate
the feasibility of their methodology, the authors validated it
using the most important speech recognition systems, such
as Apple Siri, Google Now, and others. Specifically, they
were successful in performing a variety of actions by simply
injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, including
accessing a malicious website, spying the victim accessing the
image and the sound of its device, injecting false information,
and many others.
Tab. VI summarizes our discussion and highlights similarity
and differences of the approaches.
Among other scientific contributions in this category, it
is worth mentioning the work in [110], where the authors
provided an overview of the main technologies behind VCSs,
including voice conversion and speaker verification. Further-
more, the most important spoofing attacks have been studied
in a variety of scenarios, with a focus on the modification of
a speaker’s voice to emit sounds similar to the ones emitted
by a different speaker, without modifying its content (namely,
voice conversion spoofing attacks).
2) Passive Attacks: Acoustic side-channel attacks have
been largely used to capture information from different de-
vices, such as keyboards, printers, CPU, and even to identify
information written by handwriting.
These attacks are mainly performed by placing a covert
listening device in the physical proximity of the target de-
vice. This device simply records acoustic emanations from
the victim device. Then, the recorded audio is processed
to extract the desired features, further used to train a ML-
based model. This attack has been proved to be feasible
even recording the acoustic emanation through a Voice Over
IP (VOIP) connection. The main goals include, but are not
limited to, the victim’s privacy violation, i.e., recovering the
typed/printed text, or the violation of the intellectual property,
i.e., recovering printed objects.
In the context of acoustic emanations analysis, the authors
in [5] presented an attack against dot-matrix printers, intend-
ing to recover the printed English text. The attack includes
recording the acoustic emissions with a microphone placed at
about 10 cm from the targeted device. Indeed, at such a short
distance, an attacker can recover up to 72% of printed words.
Better performances, with a recovering percentage of up to
95%, can be obtained by assuming a contextual knowledge
about the printing text. The attack can be divided into two
steps. It involves a preliminary training phase, where the sound
of printed words is recorded and used to train a machine
learning-based model, and a second recognition phase, where
printed English text is recognized. In the training phase,
a word-based approach has been used instead of decoding
individual letters, due to decay times and the induced blurring
across adjacent letters. Interestingly, the authors found that
most of the features characterizing printed sounds are located
above the 20 kHz threshold. Thus, they identify the words
in the recorded audio, analyzing the power spectral density
above the 20 kHz acoustic threshold, and then spread the filter
frequencies linearly over the whole bandwidth. Finally, they
used digital filter banks to perform sub-band decomposition
on each word. The authors tried also to perform the same
attack against Ink-jet printers and laser printers, concluding
that these printers technologies seem to be unaffected by this
kind of attack. A similar attack against manufacturing systems
has been investigated by the authors in [111]. The authors
demonstrated that the sound emitted during the creation of an
object effectively carries specific information about the pro-
cess. Indeed, this information can be leveraged to reconstruct
the printed item, even without any knowledge of the original
design, violating intellectual property. The attack consists of
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Scheme
Inaudible Max
attack
range
Target Software Attacker
Capabilities
Attack
Source
Tested
Scenario
Performance
[105] X 165 cm Apple Siri,
Google Now,
Samsung S
Voice, Cortana,
Amazon Alexa,
Huawei Hi Voice
Commands
Recognition,
Activation
Remote Office,
Cafe,
Street
Attack Accuracy
from 30% to
100% according to
the command
[107] 7 Inside Google Search
App
Commands
Recognition
Local Noiseless
Scenario
Attack Accuracy
100%
[108] 7 30 cm MFCC-based
speech
recognition
systems
Commands
Recognition,
Activation
Remote Quiet
room
Being a feasibility
study, the authors
did not provide
any performance
indicator
[109] X 50 cm Google Now,
CMU Sphinx
Commands
Recognition,
Activation
Remote Recorded
Back-
ground
noise
samples
Attack Accuracy
over 90%
TABLE VI
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six phases. In the first Acoustic Data Acquisition phase, the
acoustic emissions of the 3D printer are captured using a
microphone placed 20 cm from the target. It is followed by
a Pre-processing phase, involving the analysis of the audio
to remove undesired noise. Then, a Feature Extraction phase
is executed, where the time and frequency domain features
commonly used in speech pattern recognition are selected to
training the learning algorithm. Then, a Regression Model is
applied to determine the speed of the printing. As per the
definition, such a model consists of a collection of models each
using a supervised learning algorithm for regression. Then, a
Classification Model for Axis Prediction is used to determine
the axis movement, and a Direction Prediction Model is
applied to detect the direction of motion, using the frame
energy of the audio signal. Finally, a Model Recreation process
is applied to reconstruct the object using the output of the
previous phases. The authors tested and validated their attack
against a modern 3D printer, achieving an axis prediction
accuracy of 92.54% and a length prediction error of 6.35%
on a complicated object, such as a door key [111].
The same type of attack has been largely used also against
keyboards. In this case, the attacker aims to recover the typed
text, based on the observation that different keystrokes produce
different sounds. The authors in [112] used neural networks
with labeled training samples, identifying keystrokes using the
FFT method and achieving an accuracy of 80%. This result
has been improved a few years later by the authors in [113].
The authors revisited the attack methodology using unlabeled
keystrokes samples and Cepstrum features, increasing the
accuracy of up to 96%. A different approach is provided
in [114], motivated by the observation that the sound emanated
by a keystroke is related to its position on the keyboard. In fact,
keys that are positioned close to each other emit more similar
sounds if compared to those positioned far away. Moreover,
the authors observed that working at the granularity of words
instead of single keys, it is possible to leverage the statistical
properties of the English language. Following these intuitions,
the authors presented a dictionary attack able to recognize
single words, having from 7 to 13 letters. Through specific
signal processing tools, the authors achieved an accuracy of
73% over all the tested words. Furthermore, the attack does
not require a training phase.
All these attacks are performed placing a microphone in
the proximity of the targeted device. Despite this scenario
poses a serious threat to the confidentiality of passwords and
other sensitive text, the real applicability is limited. Indeed, the
attacker should be located in the very near physical proximity
of the user, being easily guessable.
To overcome this limitation, the authors in [115] presented
a new scenario, considered the acquisition of acoustic infor-
mation using VoIP protocols. The authors recorded keystroke
sounds through a Skype call and demonstrated the feasibility
of discovering what a user is typing, using a machine learning
classifier based on MFCC features. They also investigated
the impact that some variables have on the accuracy of their
classifier, including the bandwidth and the presence of speech
in the recorded audio.
The same attack is revisited by the authors in [6], with a
focus on the recovery of random passwords and PINs. Instead
of using a word-based approach as in previous work, the
authors presented a methodology focused on single character
detection. Thus, the accuracy of the attack depends only on
a single character detection rate, avoiding the use of any
language model and dictionaries. The training phase consists
of the collection of single keystrokes (30 instances per key).
Then, the authors used the trained model to detect randomly
generated 6-character passwords, containing only lowercase
letters (a, z), and 4 digits PINs. This is performed by using
MFCC features extracted from password keystrokes, eaves-
dropped over the remote call. A similar methodology was
used by the authors in [116], where the authors studied the
vulnerability derived by audio emanations of keyboard typing.
The authors showed that the keyboard eavesdropping attack
performance is affected by a few variables, such as the typing
style of the particular user, the data inserted by the user, and
the adopted detection strategy.
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Another type of acoustic side-channel attack was performed
by the authors in [117] against PIN pad devices. This attack,
called Differential Audio Analysis (DDA), analyzes the dif-
ferential characteristics of the sound captured by two micro-
phones placed inside the targeted device. Such a difference is
then expressed as the cross-signal transfer function. Their ex-
periments achieved the 100% of accuracy for certain devices,
while only the 63% of accuracy was achieved when the target
device does not produce the sufficient level of audible sound
in correspondence to the press of a key.
Finally, a side-channel attack against handwriting has been
investigated by the authors in [118]. The attack leverages the
acoustic emissions of people handwriting recorded through a
mobile phone. Indeed, this attack could lead to the leakage of
personal information, eavesdropping, e.g, the sound derived
from people filling out privacy-related forms. The authors
presented a methodology based on audio signal processing
and ML, able to recover the handwritten text. The audio is
recorded with a smartphone placed in the same desk of the
target user, about 30 cm far from the writer. Indeed, they
achieved an accuracy of about 60% in word recognition,
paving the way for further refinements and improvements.
The approaches described above are summarized and cross-
compared in Tab. VII.
C. Lessons Learned
The discussion on active and passive attacks carried out in
the previous subsection allows us to highlight the following
lessons learned:
• Voice activation as a defense Tool. All attacks against
the VAs described in Section VI-B are based on the
delivery of a malicious vocal command to the VCS of
the target device. Then, the audio signal is interpreted
as a legitimate command by the VA. However, to
execute it, the attacker first has to activate the VA.
The recent versions of common VAs are equipped
with a voice activation feature, enabled by default,
which allows the attacker to activate the VA with the
same methodology, as the microphone is always active.
Activating the voice assistant using a physical button, as
in the oldest versions, would significantly mitigate the
problem, requiring the attackers to use more complex
attack mechanisms, e.g., activating the VA through a
malware. These attacks are also promoted by the lack
of defense techniques protecting VAs, such as using
vocal authentication mechanisms, recognizing the voice
of authorized users and enabling them only to use the VA.
• Unintelligible/Inaudible audio commands. As
discussed in the previous section, attacks performed
through inaudible commands could be very difficult to
detect by the legitimate user. In fact, if the malicious
signal is properly modulated, the audio command
is perceived as noise by humans, while remaining
intelligible by speech recognition systems. Moreover, if
the attack is performed by using audio signals inaudible
by humans, the attack becomes completely stealthy. This
attack is enabled by the microphones commonly used
on smartphones and other electronic devices, which are
sensitive even at frequencies other than those audible to
humans. Indeed, many microphones can sense sounds
generated at frequencies higher than 20 kHz, even
without any use case justifying it.
• Extended attack range. The first attacks against VA
systems were effective only if performed near the target
device. This consideration considerably reduces the real
use cases of the attacks, making them difficult to execute.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the authors in [105],
by using the appropriate equipment and technologies,
the attack range can be extended to larger distances,
including 165cm. This wide distance, together with
the inaudible features of the malicious audio command
used for the attack, severely increases the severity of
the threat. We highlight that, also in this case, the
vulnerability is introduced mainly by the microphone,
designed with properties higher than those required
by common use cases. By decreasing the sensitivity
of the microphone, it could be possible to limit the
distance between the device and the audio source,
without affecting the usability of the VA in regular use
cases, usually requiring a distance of a few centimeters
between the user and the device.
• Audio as a side-channel. The attacks described in
Section VI-B2 demonstrate the feasibility of different
kinds of privacy leakage, mainly due to the acoustic
signals emitted by target devices. Although in many
cases the performances are not very high, and usually
some knowledge is needed about the victim’s system, the
feasibility of these attacks should not be underestimated.
The lack of effective countermeasures highlights that
further efforts by the research community are needed to
mitigate this problem.
VII. DEFENSE MECHANISMS USING SHORT-RANGE AUDIO
This section explores the use of audio channels as a de-
fense mechanism against attacks previously described. Section
VII-A provides the background, while SectionVII-B delves
into the current scientific literature.
A. Background
The effectiveness of the attacks discussed in the previous
section has motivated the design of ad-hoc defense techniques
to limit their impact.
The idea followed by many authors consists of emitting
sounds on purpose to protect the sound carrying informa-
tion about a specific process. Without loss of generality,
two approaches are used. The first is based on white noise
emission, where an audio-enabled system is coupled with the
target device and emit sounds that are flat in the frequency
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Scheme
Eavesdropp.
Position
Attack
Vector
Target Main Goal Features Algorithm Performance
[6] Same Room (15
cm)
Smartphone’s
Microphone
Keyboard Password
and PIN
Detection
Sequential
Minimal
Optimiza-
tion
MFCC Attack
accuracy
74.33%
[118] Same Writing
Surface (20-30
cm)
Smartphone’s
Microphone
Hand
writing
Word
Detection
SVM
Based
FFT Attack
accuracy
55%
[5] Same Room (10
cm)
Sennheiser
MKH-8040
microphone
Dot-
matrix
printer
Recover
Printed
English Text
Undeclared Sub-band
decomposi-
tion
Attack
accuracy
72%
[111] Same Room (20
cm)
Condenser
microphone
Zoom H6
3D
printers
Reconstruct
Printed
Object
Regression
Model
Frame
energy, Zero
Crossing
Rate, energy
entropy,
spectral
entropy,
spectral flux,
MFCC
Attack
accuracy
92.54%
[117] Inside the Target
Device
2
microphones
PIN
pads
PIN
detection
Yule-
Walker
Auto-
regressive
Method
Signal
Transfer
Function
Attack
accuracy
100%
TABLE VII
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spectrum and overcome, in volume, the other ones. The second
approach, instead, is based on the generation of sounds that are
equal to the ones produced by the target device, thus poisoning
the information received by the attacker.
The following discussion provides details about the usage
of such techniques in specific sensitive conditions.
B. Literature Overview
A glaring example is provided by the authors in [119]
and [120], in the context of vibration-based communications.
These contributions tackle the PIN-Vibra method [121], used
to transmit the keying material between two devices thanks
to an ON-OFF vibration scheme. The receiver, equipped
with MEMS motors, can detect the presence of vibrations
and decode the key or, in general, a piece of information.
While being exciting, these techniques have been demon-
strated to be susceptible to eavesdropping attacks exploring
the sound generated by vibrations [70], [122]. To overcome
such attacks, [120] proposed Vibreaker, a system minimizing
the leakage of information from the vibration-based com-
munication channel via white noise masking. Specifically,
Vibreaker couples the physical vibration with simultaneous
audio emissions via the microphone of the smartphones in-
volved in the communication. White noise is emitted by the
microphone to cover sounds emitted by the vibrations, while
low-frequency tones are further generated on-purpose and
emitted to compensate for the partial inability of smartphone
speakers to emit low-bandwidth sounds. On the attacker side,
the best (minimum) Error Rate is 30%, that is very far to
be acceptable for any valuable usage. Note that, while the
user is not explicitly involved in the process (with undoubted
usability gains), equipping the devices with a microphone
causes a little overhead on the system, requiring not only
motor accelerators but also audio-enabled devices. Similar
properties were used by the authors in [123], in the context of
medical devices. As before, the main communication channel
is vibration-based and it involves a medical device and external
equipment (smartphone or handheld). The proposed scheme,
namely SecureVibe, is secured against acoustic eavesdropping
derived from vibrations by generating appropriate masking
sounds. As for the previous proposals, despite not requiring
any active user involvement, this countermeasure forces a little
overhead in the required components, as a speaker should be
added (or coupled) with the medical device.The authors tested
the effectiveness of their scheme against the ICA technique,
and they verified that the scheme is secure up to a distance of
15 cm between the communicating entities. Instead, when the
distance is higher than 15 cm, the ICA technique could be used
to isolate the single signals, compromising the effectiveness of
the technique.
Emitting white noise and fake keystrokes sounds are pro-
posed by the authors in [124] and [6] to protect against at-
tacks on keyboard typing. As thoroughly described in Section
VI, the mechanical sound emitted by pressing and releasing
keyboard keys can lead to their identification. To provide
an effective defense, white noise and fake keystrokes are
proposed, and their impact on the capability of the adversary to
recover the correct key is evaluated. The best performance are
achieved using fake keystrokes, where the attacker achieves a
minimum error rate of 33%.
A similar defense mechanism is proposed by the authors
in [125], concerning a zero-effort de-authentication system
called ZEBRA, proposed by the authors in [126]. The system
is made up of two components: a smartwatch and a software
running on the PC, pre-paired wirelessly to each other. Both
of them record the event they observe, including keyboard
and mouse interactions, and the software on the PC compares
continuously the recorded events, evaluating their matching.
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When they no longer match, the user is assumed to be
far from the PC and the user is de-authenticated. Several
contributions, such as [127], demonstrated that ZEBRA can
be cheated by an adversary that mimics the behavior of the
user, e.g., via keystroke sounds emitted on-purpose. To provide
a defense against such attacks, the authors propose to use
the sound masking strategy, obtained by having the login
terminals or a device placed in the surrounding environment
to produce deliberate sounds, obfuscating the sound coming
from the keyboards, and thus limiting the attacker possibility
to reproduce the victim user’s activities. Compared to the
legacy ZEBRA scheme, the described defense mechanisms can
improve the robustness to the aforementioned attacks up to the
70% error rate on the attacker side, complicating the effort of
the adversary.
Defense-mechanisms using white-spectrum noise to thwart
passive eavesdroppers are also used by [39] and [128]. The
system proposed in these contributions consists of a sound-
based communication channel, where speakers and micro-
phones are used to deliver and receive information encoded in
short-range audio messages. Given that the same speakers and
microphones are used to emit the white-spectrum noise, this
is the only technique where the defense mechanism can really
be defined as device-free, as it does not require any additional
device if compared to the unsecured scenario. While in the
regular setting of the algorithm the ICA algorithm can isolate
the waveforms in 90% of the cases at a minimum distance
of 5cm, using random movements with a speed of 30cm/s
the effectiveness of the ICA technique decreases to the 40%,
complicating the task of identifying the correct waveform
emitted by the legitimate devices.
A similar approach was used by the authors in [129].
Specifically, the authors proposed a system called Dhwani, i.e.,
an acoustics-based NFC system that uses the microphone and
speakers on mobile phones within the same scope of legacy
NFC communications, thus eliminating any specialized NFC
hardware. As for [39] and [128], Dhwani uses the JamSe-
cure technique, i.e., a self jamming strategy combined with
self-interference cancellation at the receiver. This technique
allows achieving secure communications from the information
perspective among the communicating entities.
It is worth noting that, while the sum of audio signals
could be a simple solution to avoid the leak of information
towards trivial adversaries, smart and powerful adversaries can
theoretically recur to algorithms such as ICA to decouple the
summed signals, leading to the identification of the single
components [38]. However, some experimental studies per-
formed by the authors in [123], [39] and [105] experimentally
demonstrated that if the two sound sources are very close
to each other—e.g., within few centimeters—, the channel
difference cannot be recognized by the receiving microphones,
thus nullifying the efficacy of the ICA solution.
Another property of the audio signal that can be leveraged
to provide enhanced defense tools is the proximity of two
devices. Indeed, a well-known property of the audio signal is
its quick attenuation over distance and physical barriers. Thus,
the amplitude difference between the two recordings can be
used to provide a rough estimation of the proximity of two
devices. This principle is used in [130] to provide a solution
for the Home Alone Wearable (HAW) attack. This attack is
based on the assumption that users do not lock their wearable
after their use and leave them unattended, hence enabling a
malicious adversary to use the wearable to access information
on the user device—e.g., a smartphone. To detect physical
proximity between the user’s smartphone and the wearable, the
wearable triggers the phone to produce a sound, and both the
devices record it via the microphone. The wearable then sends
the recording to the smartphone via a Bluetooth connection,
and the particular command issued on the wearable is executed
only if the similarity score between the two recording exceeds
a given threshold. It is worth noting that the user is not
involved in the process, i.e., he/she does not have to state
its explicit consent to authorize the information exchange.
However, the wearable should be equipped with a microphone
and the generated sound should be in the audible range, given
that the microphones on the wearables usually cannot sample
a tone in the ultrasound frequency range.
With the same objective in mind and using the same
basic concepts, i.e., physical proximity, the iLock technique
proposed by [131] recognizes the user’s presence through the
evaluation of the physical separation from the personal device,
leveraging the changes in the wireless acoustic signals, and it
immediately locks the hosting device if a threshold distance
is overcome. iLock is based on the calculation of the ToF
of the high-frequency acoustic signals (ultrasounds) emitted
by the speakers. Being designed for smartphones, iLock does
not require additional devices, given that microphones and
speakers are already available in every commercial device,
and it does not involve any further human effort. However,
when applied in other devices, such as wearables, it could
lead to an increase in the minimum features to be included in
the system design. Considering the strongest attacker (i.e., an
attacker that is closer to the phone than the legitimate user),
iLock achieves a detection accuracy of the 60% when there is
a difference of 0-270 degrees between the orientation of the
user and the orientation of the attackers to the phone.
Physical proximity between communicating devices is also
used by the authors in [132] to defend against Reader-and-
Ghost attacks affecting NFC devices. In these attacks, a
malicious reader tries to involve a legitimate NFC device in an
unwanted transaction, piloted by a ghost adversary in another
physical location, while the owner of the device wanted to per-
form a different transaction. To solve this issue, a transaction
verification process is required, where the owner of the device
specifically approves that transaction, and not a different one.
To provide a defense mechanism against such a threat, the
authors in [132] proposed a transaction verification strategy
able to assure the proximity between a server and a mobile
phone, leveraging the correlation between the related ambient
audio recordings. The similarity between the two recordings
is established via the computation of the cross-correlation,
as described in Section II-D, and it does not require any
user involvement. Without loss of generality, the work by the
authors in [132] aims at detecting the co-presence between the
involved devices. As discussed in previous sections III, IV,
and IV-B, co-presence detection strategies, including context-
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based strategies based on multiple sensing sources, are used
for a variety of security-related tasks, including authentication,
pairing, and access control. We refer the interested reader to
the recent survey in [9] for a comprehensive overview of
the strategies using sensing modalities other than the audio
channel.
Tab. VIII summarizes the above contributions and highlights
similarities and differences across the application scenarios.
C. Lessons Learned
The most important considerations and take-home messages
arising from the above discussion are summarized below.
• Protecting against Acoustic Eavesdropping. In many
cases, the audio channel can be used as a side-channel at-
tack vector, to gain information exchanged using another
channel, such as vibration. To protect against these events,
dedicated sounds are introduced. These synthetic sounds
aim to pollute the audio communication channel, decor-
relating it with the main communication channel and thus
nullifying its eavesdropping potential. The schemes used
to achieve this objective can be manifold, e.g., based
on white noise, random sounds, or dedicated sounds
mimicking the ones produced by the main communication
channel, such as fake vibrations or keystrokes.
• Masking Sound Challenges. The robustness of any
audio-based defense scheme leveraging dedicated sounds
emitted on purpose should be evaluated against the Inde-
pendent Component Analysis (ICA) attack. Among the
wide possible number of solutions to decouple signals
emitted by different sources, ICA has been demonstrated
to be the most effective one, and to be particularly
successful when the emitting sources are sufficiently far
each from the others. Therefore, masking sounds are
suggested as an audio-based defense scheme in situations
where the emitting sources are very close to each other,
such as in the context of Implanted Medical Devices or
voice-controlled IoT devices. When a consistent separa-
tion exists between the sources of the audio signal, the
designer of the solution should ensure that the attacker
could not deploy a sufficient number of receivers to be
able to perform subsequent analysis.
• Usability and Transparency of Audio-based Defense
Schemes. Any audio-based defense solution should deal
with the resulting usability of the system. In the litera-
ture, the usability of the solution is often evaluated by
looking at the requirement of additional components to
the system, as well as to the explicit involvement of the
user in the application of the defense strategy. Therefore,
any valuable defense scheme should require neither any
additional component nor the explicit involvement of the
legitimate users. At the same time, possible distraction
factors on the user’s side should be reduced. For instance,
when dealing with fake keystroke injection, despite the
proposed defense scheme could be valuable and effective,
the resulting distraction factors on the user could make
the defense solution hardly usable.
VIII. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
In the following, we identify the relevant research
challenges related to each of the application domain analyzed
in previous sections. We believe that the following discussion
could be relevant for researchers actively working in the area,
for inspiring new solutions and enhancing existing ones.
Privacy-preserving Two-Factor Authentication. The
existing approaches, thoroughly described in Section III,
have been demonstrated to be able to reach a very high
level of usability, similar if not superior to existing token-
based approaches. However, privacy concerns still represent
a pressing issue. Indeed, leveraging pure ambient sounds
exposes the whole scheme to biasing by malicious adversaries,
as well as to co-located MITM attacks. A successful solution
to these issues leverages the generation of random sounds
on the server, but it forces the authenticating device to
deliver the local recordings to the server itself, possibly
leaking information about the surrounding environment. Thus,
privacy-preserving TFA mechanisms based on short-range
audio signals are still missing. Possible solutions to face
these privacy issues could leverage innovative encryption
techniques, such as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) strategies,
widely emerging in the last years [133]. Indeed, the HE
paradigm is a particular type of encryption, that can address
the above privacy concerns by allowing a third actor to use
encrypted data without the need to decrypt them.
In the context of audio-based TFA, the smartphone in
possession of the user and the browser can first record the
ambient sound, then encrypt the data recording using one of
the many available HE techniques, and finally, deliver it to the
server in the form of encrypted data. At the reception of the
data, the server could compare the sounds recorded locally
and remotely, operating over encrypted data, minimizing
privacy concerns. These techniques have been already applied
in various application contexts to similar privacy issues, such
as in [134] and [135].
We remark that, despite FHE strategies are normally associated
to heavy computational requirements, few contributions in
the literature already demonstrated that the main source
of the computational overhead is not related to encryption
operations, but only to operations over the encrypted data
[136]. In the short-range audio TFA scenario, comparisons
operations over encrypted data are executed on powerful
servers, that can reduce the time needed to provide a decision
by allocating more resources for this task.
Thus, the browser and the smartphone could deliver encrypted
data to the server, without any risk for potential privacy
issues.
Despite the promising directions, however, the first Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme has been revealed
only in 2009, and still needs further improvements and
refinements to be practical on nowadays computing
25
Scheme
Audio
Signal
Main
Channel
Physical
Property
Device
free
Explicit User
Involvement
Scope
Perf.
[119],
[120]
White
Noise
Vibration Masking
Sounds
7 7 Eavesdropping
Protection Attacker
Best Error
Rate 30%
[123]
White
Noise
Vibration Masking
Sounds
7 X Eavesdropping
Protection 50% Error
Rate up to
10 cm
[124],
[6]
White
Noise,
Fake
Keystrokes
Acoustic
(Keystroke)
New
sounds
generation
7 7 Eavesdropping
Protection Keystroke
Detection
Error Rate
33%
[125]
White
Noise,
Music
Sounds
Acoustic
(Keystroke)
Masking
Sounds
7 7 Eavesdropping
Protection Attacker
Error Rate
70%
[39],
[128],
[129]
White
Noise
Acoustic Masking
Sound
(Eraseable)
X 7 Eavesdropping
Protection Eavesdropping
Success Rate
40%
[130]
Fake
Audible
and
Ambient
Sound
RF Proximity
Detection
7 7 Anti-Theft
Maximum
Attacker
False
Acceptance
Rate 5.3%
[131]
Ultrasound Physical
Contact
Distance
Bounding
7 7 Anti-Theft
Attack
Detection
accuracy
60%
[132]
Ambient
Sound
NFC Proximity
Detection
7 7 Transaction
Verification Attack
Detection
Accuracy
100%
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platforms [137].
Lightweight Solutions to MITM Attacks. Despite the
recent contribution in [65] provided a viable solution to
overcome co-located MITM attacks, further work is still
necessary. Indeed, running a fingerprint evaluation process
as the one provided by the authors in [66] could not be
viable on more constrained devices, both because of the high
processing capabilities required to provide a classification
in a reasonable time, and because of the high number of
audio messages to be exchanged. Alternative solutions could
leverage an enhanced selection of features to fingerprint the
audio environment in a specific location around a device,
further minimizing the area around the target that could lead
to a co-located MITM attack. Here, the challenge also lies
in the minimal complexity of the fingerprinting process on
devices such as commercial smartphones, not featuring the
same processing and storage capabilities of server platforms.
Non Invasive Audio-Based Pairing Schemes. In the
context of pairing, reducing the involvement of the human
user is the most pressing issue. Indeed, removing the
human from the process could also pave the way to less
invasive solutions, not requiring audible sounds. The resulting
stealthiness of the paring process could theoretically broaden
the application scenarios where audio-based pairing schemes
could be performed. This shift, however, cannot prescind
from auxiliary means to verify that the pairing process is
ongoing exactly between the intended devices.
Facing Overshadowing Attacks in Constrained Devices.
Novel solutions to face inaudible overshadowing attacks are
highly required. Despite the solution based on security signals
proposed in [4] is effective, it could be very energy and
time demanding in specific contexts, i.e., involving Bluetooth
and other battery-powered devices, where turning on the
microphone or the speaker many times could be undesirable.
In addition, requiring the sharing of secrets between the
devices, such a solution is not practical when pairing devices
previously unknown to each other.
Acoustic Eavesdropping Risks Analysis. Acoustic
eavesdropping in the context of pairing deserves more
attention. Indeed, even if the acoustic eavesdropping is a
well-known threat, actually it does not seem a crucial one,
given that the data delivered on the audio channel cannot
be used to launch an attack. Indeed, it is worth noting that
encryption techniques, as well as other security techniques,
are very rarely applied to the audio signals, and their misuse
could easily lead to severe threats. For instance, it is not
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clear if simple Replay Attacks, performed by recording and
playing back again the recorded audio signals, could lead to
more severe threats when launched on audio-based pairing
protocols.
Overcoming the Hardware Heterogeneity. The
heterogeneity of microphones and speakers, as well as
their different tolerance to the noise in different application
scenarios, take part in degrading the performance of audio-
based pairing schemes when moved away from a suitable
application scenario. For instance, as shown by the authors
in [69], the same Zero-Interaction audio-based solution report
very different performance in indoor and outdoor scenarios.
To overcome these limitations, researchers should design
coefficient and comparison methods able to both remove
inherent inaccuracies in the devices’ hardware, and evaluate
similarities and differences between recorded sounds in
heterogeneous application domains.
In real deployments, the devices taking part in the pairing
process could be very heterogeneous, being different not
only in the number and the nature of embedded sensors, but
also in the hardware chips providing sensing capabilities.
These considerations are at the basis of several context-based
pairing approaches, relying on physical properties that are
invariant compared to the configuration of the pairing device.
In this context, the microphones sensing the state of the
audio channel could provide a different intensity and timing
of a particular event. Thus, pairing approaches leveraging the
audio channel should be able to remove time and intensity
differences between pairing devices.
Securing Voice Assistants. Despite the relevant advances
of the last years, securing voice assistants is still an issue.
While actual solutions for authorizing the usage of voice
assistants are referred to as Authentication techniques, in
practice they only provide a probabilistic assurance that who
is issuing commands is effectively authorized. Limitations
still exist, e.g., the approach in [104] has an uncertainty
area of ±15 degrees around the target. Thus, it is very
effective in the proximity of the source, but it loses efficiency
when the source is far. Similarly, the speaker fingerprinting
technique applied in [19] may become inaccurate when in
the background there is not silence, but other sounds. This is
a typical situation in navigation assistants or voice assistants
running on smartphones. At the same time, biometric
recognition techniques to identify the voice of a (set of)
legitimate owner(s) have still received little attention from the
community, and needs to be further investigated to prove its
effectiveness. This is especially true when they are applied
on constrained devices, such as IoT audio-controlled devices.
Indeed, efficient and effective techniques are needed, possibly
coupling already available solutions in an engineered fashion.
Sound Masking Effectiveness Evaluation. Currently,
many audio-based defense techniques are based on sound
masking strategies, described in Section II-E. However, some
contributions such as [39] already provided evidence that this
technique can fail to provide the desired masking properties if
the sources of the audio signal, i.e., the genuine sound and the
masking sound, are located sufficiently far from each other.
This limitation seems to be a big issue in specific contexts.
For instance, when protecting sounds emitted by keys on a
keyboard, the speaker of the laptop and the keyboard could be
sufficiently far from each other to allow an attacker to identify
the location of the device emitting the particular sound. At
the same time, the effectiveness of injecting fake sounds
is still not widely assessed in practical conditions. Indeed,
the effectiveness of these techniques should be carefully
evaluated in the presence of attackers able to recognize and
to tell apart sounds emitted by a speaker and mechanical
sounds, recalling the technique used in [66].
Proximity Detection Schemes Improvement. Another
defense tool leveraging audio signals is proximity detection.
This approach refers to the similarity of ambient audio
to assess co-presence between communicating devices. As
shown in a recent contribution [138], it is feasible for a
powerful attacker to manipulate the context and bypass the
proximity detection evaluation by biasing the environment,
e.g., inserting sounds or predicting the environment. Thus,
audio-based proximity detection could be probably more
useful if used in combination with other co-presence detection
methods, in a way to force the attackers to realize more
expensive and powerful attacks. Indeed, proximity detection
could not provide a definitive assurance that the attacker
cannot overcome the defense strategies. Thus, contributions
are still needed in this area.
Attacks and Defenses via Directional Microphones.
The large majority of attacks available in the literature and
discussed in the previous section focused on omnidirectional
microphones. Indeed, as per their definition, they can
pick up sounds from almost every direction with the
same performances. While this can be a useful feature in
some scenarios, there are situations where an enhanced
sensitivity towards particular sounds is desired. In this
context, directional microphones can provide a meaningful
solution. Indeed, a directional microphone is more sensitive
to picking up sounds in certain directions rather than others.
At the same time, specific types of directional microphones
increase the reception range along a specific direction, as they
can detect sounds emitted at a higher distance than regular
omnidirectional ones [139], [140]. Indeed, these interesting
features make them an attractive choice both for attacks
and defense. On the one hand, attackers could increase the
minimum required distance to launch an attack against a
target device. On the other hand, directional microphones
can implicitly reject attackers located outside the main
reception lobe. Despite their evident advantages, the use
of directional microphones for both attacks and defense is
still not widespread yet. Hence, it represents a promising
and interesting research direction to improve state-of-the-art
results and to come up with innovative security tools.
Advanced Security Schemes via 3D Audio. Thanks to
the very high pace of technological innovations, the first
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3D Audio systems are hitting the market, with the promise
to significantly enhance the sound experience of moving
users and devices [141]. 3D audio recordings are created by
placing a large number of microphones in the area. In this
way, the sound of the scene is recorded at the same time
from different positions, allowing to re-create the real sound
experience of a moving entity. From the security perspective,
3D audio schemes could have a disrupting potential, both
from the attack and from the defense side. To date, there are
no studies in the literature that investigate this venue, that is
probably the most novel and promising one in the short-range
audio-based security context.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided a thorough survey of
mechanisms, applications, use-cases, and research challenges
for short-range audio channels security. We showed that,
thanks to enhanced usability features and low deployment
costs, techniques based on short-range audio channels can be
used as a means to achieve innovative and effective security
services, such as Two-Factor Authentication, pairing, and
device authorization schemes, to name a few. These properties
are enforced by leveraging specific physical-layer features of
the audio channels, such as distance bounding and physical
proximity detection of devices sharing the same audio context.
We have also shown that, if not integrated correctly, such
methodologies could be subject to a variety of attacks. Thus,
research is needed to improve defense solutions based on
short-range audio signals.
Finally, we have also highlighted upcoming research chal-
lenges. The exposed challenges show that the development of
audio-based solutions is still an exciting research area, and
that it can be inspiring for researchers, industry, and start-
ups, striving for innovative, non-invasive, and computationally
lightweight means to enforce systems security.
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